NORTHERN NIGERIA.

2328
1941

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO

SOKOTO, HADEIJA, AND THE MUNSHI COUNTRY.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
August, 1907.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Serial No.	From or to whom.	—	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1906.		
1	The High Commissioner.	Telegram	January 3 (Rec. Jan. 4.)	Reports that the Royal Niger Company's depôt at Abinsi has been destroyed and the navigation of the Benue closed, and that he is making preparations for a strong military expedition.	1
2	To the High Commissioner.	Telegram	January 17	Asks what will be the extent of country covered by the proposed military operations and the strength of the force employed.	1
3	The High Commissioner.	Telegram	January 19 (Rec. Jan. 20.)	Replies to foregoing telegram	1
4	To the High Commissioner.	Telegram	January 27	Instructs him that the despatch of a large expedition cannot be sanctioned without further information, and that if this cannot be furnished by telegraph the advance should be limited to what is necessary to open the Benue and protect property.	2
5	The High Commissioner.	Telegram	January 29 (Rec. Jan. 30.)	Reports mischief done by Munshis, and the necessity for energetic action; requests to be informed whether expedition is to be cancelled.	2
6	To the High Commissioner.	Telegram	February 2	Informs him that the Secretary of State does not cancel the expedition, but that it is most desirable that it should not be carried further than the immediate object renders necessary.	2
7	The High Commissioner.	—	January 17 (Rec. Feb. 17.)	Gives further particulars, in addition to those already given by telegraph, as to the destruction of Abinsi and the action he has taken.	2
8	Ditto	Telegram	February 16 (Rec. Feb. 20.)	Reports that a Mahdi has arisen near Sokoto and defeated mounted infantry and captured a Maxim. Gives list of casualties; the situation gives cause for anxiety.	3
	Ditto	Telegram	February 24 (Rec. Feb. 25.)	Reports that attitude of Hadeija is threatening, and recommends that force on the spot should be strengthened.	4
	To the High Commissioner.	Telegram	February 26	Approves of sending troops to Hadeija, subject to certain conditions.	4

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Serial No.	From or to whom.	—	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1906.		
11	To the High Commissioner.	—	March 9	Enquires whether he is aware of any recent circumstances which may have tended to increase hostility or provoke suspicion in the minds of the Munshis or of any other causes that may have precipitated the outbreak.	4
12	The High Commissioner.	—	February 7 (Rec. Mar. 9.)	Reports instructions issued to the officer in command of the Munshi expedition on receipt of No. 4.	4
13	Ditto	Telegram	March 12 (Rec. Mar. 15.)	Reports that the troops concentrated at Sokoto have defeated the rebels, and that the troops from the Munshi country have arrived at Zungaru completely successful.	5
14	Ditto	—	February 14 (Rec. Mar. 16.)	Reports further details of the affair at Abinsi; requests permission to send the expeditionary force through the country between the Katsena river and the Bassa Province.	6
15	Ditto	—	February 21 (Rec. Mar. 23.)	Confirms No. 8, and reports intelligence received and steps taken; states that there is unrest at Hadeija and Burmi.	7
16	Ditto	—	February 22 (Rec. Mar 23.)	Reports news received from Major Burdon at Sokoto.	10
17	Ditto	—	February 28 (Rec. Mar. 30.)	Reports cause of the reverse at Sokoto, and further news received from Major Burdon.	10
18	Ditto	—	March 7 (Rec. April 4.)	Forwards full reports on the rising by Major Burdon and others and submits remarks.	13
19	Ditto	—	March 14 (Rec. Apr. 14.)	Reports further on the Sokoto rising ...	27
20	Ditto	—	March 21 (Rec. Apr. 19.)	Reports on the further developments in regard to the disturbances around Sokoto and elsewhere.	30
21	Ditto	—	April 11 (Rec. May 12.)	Reports deposition of the Emir of Gando, and that Haliru of Kalgo has been made Emir.	31
22	Ditto	—	April 19 (Rec. May 16.)	Reports, in reply to No. 11, that he is not aware of any recent circumstances tending to increase the hostility of the Munshis or to provoke suspicion, and that the fighting arose out of a petty dispute between two natives.	32
23	Ditto	—	April 28 (Rec. June 1.)	Transmits report by Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler on the operations in the Munshi country.	32
24	To the High Commissioner.	—	June 7	Acknowledges receipt of Nos. 17 to 20, and expresses satisfaction at the prompt measures taken to deal with the situation, and the loyalty shown by the native Emirs.	[illegible]
25	The High Commissioner.	—	May 9 (Rec. June 9.)	Reports further on the state of affairs at Sokoto and Hadeija, and in the east.	[illegible]

Serial No.	From or to whom.	——	Date.	Subject.	Page
			1906.		
26	Sir F. Lugard ...	—	July 19	Forwards reports by officers in command of field operations near Sokoto and at Hadeija.	40
27	The Niger Company, Limited.	—	October 23	Calls attention to the state of affairs in the Munshi country, and submits proposals for establishing peaceful relations and developing trade.	56
28	To Sir F. Lugard ...	—	November 22	Requests his observations on the proposal of the Company that post should be established at Katsena in the Munshi country.	58
29	Sir F. Lugard ...	—	November 26	In reply to No. 28, fears that the occupation of Katsena will not obviate the necessity for an exhibition of force, and that the coercion of the hostile sections of the Munshi and Okpoto clans must be undertaken before the country can be opened up to trade and to peaceful relations.	58
30	The Acting High Commissioner.	—	November 1 (Rec. Nov. 30.)	Requests authority to bring the Okpoto country under subjection during the dry season.	59
			1907.		
31	To the Acting High Commissioner.	Telegram	January 2	Sanctions necessary measures to put a stop to Okpoto raids near Dekina and guarantee navigation of the Benue River, but cannot sanction proposed march through the Okpoto and Munshi countries.	60
32	Ditto	—	January 4	Acknowledges receipt of No. 30, and explains the decision conveyed by telegraph in No. 31.	60
33	The Acting High Commissioner.	—	March 25 (Rec. Apr. 20.)	Reports the measures taken to patrol the Okpoto and Agatu countries and the establishment of a post at Katsena Allah.	61

NORTHERN NIGERIA.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO

SOKOTO, HADEIJA, AND THE MUNSHI COUNTRY.

No. 1.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.51 p.m., January 4, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No.* 2.]

January 3. Munshi tribe has destroyed Royal Niger Company's depôt, Abinsi. Navigation of Benue closed. Making necessary preparations for strong military expedition.—LUGARD.

No. 2.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

(Sent 4.40 p.m., January 17, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No.* 3.]

January 17. Referring to your telegram of January 3,* anxious to know what will be the probable extent of country covered by proposed military operations and strength of corps employed.—ELGIN.

No. 3.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.44 a.m., January 20, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No.* 4.]

January 19. Referring to your telegram of 17th January,† Munshi country extends to the south of Benue from longitude eight short of ten together with small area to the north of Benue. No information at present what section incriminated. Strength of corps 26 officers, 640 rank and file; see my despatch‡ by last mail.—LUGARD.

* No. 1. † No. 2. ‡ No. 7.

No. 4.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

(Sent 3 p.m., January 27, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No.* 5.]

Referring to your telegram of January 19,* I am not prepared to approve despatch of large expedition without further information of objects proposed. If these cannot be explained by telegraph, advance should be limited to what is necessary to open Benue navigation and protect any property but should not be carried further without my sanction.—ELGIN.

No. 5.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.5 p.m., January 30, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No.* 6.]

January 29. Referring to your telegram of 27th January,† Munshis have burnt to the ground Niger Company's store, carrying off everything. By latest reports 600 corpses remain at site of Abinsi; numbers drowned, carried off, unknown. One prominent Munshi chief has made declaration of friendship, offering services. Propose to follow offenders, inflict punishment, recover property, captives, and afterwards traverse Munshiland. If not done forthwith they may break out anywhere, rendering Benue waterway unsafe. Germans making use of route. Force considered most ample against any contingency. It seems to me favourable opportunity for settlement of the question once and for all. There is reason to fear that unless energetic action taken at once north-bank Munshis and also Okpotos will give trouble. Much regret if I exceeded legitimate action. As I received no further instructions from you, supposed that action proposed in my telegram of 3rd January‡ was approved. Request you to inform me at once whether you order cancellation of expedition.—LUGARD.

No. 6.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

(Sent 1 p.m., February 2, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

February 2. Referring to your telegram of 29th January,§ I do not order cancellation of expedition, but it is most desirable that it should not be carried farther than immediate object renders necessary.—ELGIN.

No. 7.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received February 17, 1906.)

MY LORD, Government House, Zungeru, January 17, 1906.

IN continuation of my telegram of the 3rd instant,‡ I have the honour to inform you that late in the evening of the 2nd instant, I received a telegram from Mr. Seume, Telegraph Inspector, who was on his way up the Benue, which read as follows: "Urgent. Arrived Abinsi 31st ultimo aboard "Pelican"; found town in flames and Hausas fighting Munshis. Kept them off till 11 a.m., 1st instant, and only abandoned place when burnt to the ground, and looted Niger Company's store. Also drove the women and children into the river, and river traffic is stopped.

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* No. 3. † No. 4. ‡ No. 1. § No. 5.

Please advise. Have returned to Loko. Have advised Keffi and Amar." A subsequent telegram informed me that a native canoe in tow of Government canoe, had been so over-weighted by refugees crowding upon her that she had been sunk.

2. I gave orders that an advance force of 100 rank and file should at once proceed up the Benue to rescue any refugees, and secure life and property. Captain Short left Lokoja in accordance with these orders on 4th January. He reports that the Munshis have completely razed the Company's depôt to the ground, and that the environs are "strewed with headless corpses."

3. I instructed the Commandant at the same time to prepare a strong force to undertake reprisals against the Munshis, and, if possible, to arrest the ring-leaders in this outrage, and recover any captures and property carried off. Colonel Hasler, Acting Commandant, himself proposes to take command, with Colonel Dobell, Commanding Officer, 1st battalion, as his second, in order, if necessary, to take command of a separate column, and the force, which will number 26 officers, 2 medical officers, 13 British non-commissioned officers, 2 medical non-commissioned officers, 642 rank and file, 38 permanent gun-carriers, 28 Maxim gun-carriers, 2 Q.F. guns, 4 Maxims, approximately 800 carriers, is expected to leave Lokoja about January 21st.

4. I anticipated that the Munshis would force the Government to take action shortly, with the object of checking their repeated aggressions, but, before I had had time to institute any enquiries as to their recent behaviour, the news of this outrage reached me.

5. The Munshi tribe occupy the south bank of the Benue from about the 8th degree of longitude to the neighbourhood of Wakari on the east, and are believed to extend far into Southern Nigeria. They also occupy a limited area on the north bank. It was this latter comparatively small section which attacked the telegraph construction party in 1899 and 1900, and led to an expedition being sent against them in the latter year. This tribe is the only large and important one in Northern Nigeria which has never been subdued, and the considerable extent of country they occupy has, for the most part, never been visited by a European. I had hoped that I might be able to postpone any action which might become necessary against them until the Government of Southern Nigeria was in a position to ensure the inviolability of our frontier to the south, and to prevent that section of the tribe which is domiciled within its territory from making common cause against the troops of Northern Nigeria, but this recent outrage, of course, compels immediate action.

6. I am glad to inform you, on the other hand, that the Munshi Chief Qwe, of Agamba, has sent in envoys repudiating any participation in the rising, and offering to supply guides to the expedition; the towns under this chief are reported to have refused to join the rising, and to be most anxious to keep on friendly terms with Government.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

No. 8.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.46 a.m., February 20, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

February 16. Regret to report that Mahdi has arisen near Sokoto. He has completely defeated one company of mounted infantry 14th February (and) captured Maxim. Hillary, Scott, Blackwood reported killed. Report unconfirmed. Ellis, Medical Officer, severely wounded. Troops will be moved from Munshi. Emir, Sokoto, will probably be friendly. Gando will probably be hostile. Situation of affairs gives me sufficient cause for anxiety.—LUGARD.

No. 9.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.40 p.m., February 25, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

February 24. Attitude of section of people Hadeija has been consistently threatening, greatly adding to anxiety in present difficulty. Consider it necessary to put a stop to this threat by arresting ringleaders. I am uncertain which side Emir likely to take, it will be necessary to have strong force on the spot under senior officer. Urge strongly that advisable to take course suggested by me in order to avoid constantly being threatened.—LUGARD.

No. 10.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

(Sent 6.48 p.m., February 26, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

February 26. Referring to your telegram,* Hadeija, proposals approved if necessary as part of plan of action for relief present difficulty Sokoto, always provided that forces at your disposal sufficient. I hope that Emir may not resist, and that object may be attained without actual fighting.—ELGIN.

No. 11.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

[*Answered by No.* 25.]

SIR, Downing Street, March 9, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 17th of January,† relative to the attack made by the Munshi tribe on the Niger Company's station at Abinsi.

2. I observe that in your annual report on the Protectorate you described the Munshis as "maintaining their independent and hostile attitude," but I should be glad to learn whether you are aware of any recent circumstances which may have tended to increase hostility or to provoke suspicion in the minds of the tribe, or of any other causes that may have precipitated this outbreak.

I have, &c.,
ELGIN.

No. 12.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received March 9, 1906.)

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
MY LORD, Zungeru, February 7, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatch of 17th ultimo,† I have the honour to inform

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* No. 9. † No. 7.

you that, in accordance with my telegram to you of 2nd (? 3rd) January,* I proceeded with the equipment of a strong expedition to exact reprisals for the outrage committed by the Munshis at Abinsi. The expedition was ready to start on Sunday, the 21st January, and, as I had received no reply to my telegram of 2nd January, I gave Colonel Hasler permission to start, since, looking to the nature of the outrage, I supposed that the non-receipt of any reply from your Lordship indicated that you concurred in my proposal, and in such circumstances that you hardly considered it necessary to give specific sanction.

2. On 28th January I received your telegram† informing me you were not prepared to approve the despatch of the expedition without further information. This I telegraphed to you next day,‡ at the same time instructing Colonel Hasler in the sense of your telegram. The expedition accordingly remained inactive at Abinsi until I received your cablegram of 2nd February,§ which I communicated to the officer in command, instructing him that he should limit his action to the punishment of the persons actually concerned in the attack and any who might combine with them, and endeavour to arrest the promoters of the outrage and to recover any captives and the property carried off. He should then return to Abinsi, and if, after discussion with the Residents of the provinces, it was manifest that the Munshis living on both banks were hostile and likely to interfere with the navigation of the Benue, he should march along the bank at a certain distance from the river and put an end to the disturbance. I trust that these instructions are in accordance with your Lordship's wishes.

3. This tribe are in the habit of constantly raiding the peaceful tribes under the protection of the Administration; and I had thought that in these circumstances it would be advisable to deal with the whole matter once for all. Each section whose country is not traversed by the expedition consider that we are afraid of them, or that some fetish or juju which they have invoked is too powerful for us. The result in every case has been that they have become so aggressive that measures have had to be taken later, thus causing more bloodshed and more expenditure than would have occurred had the whole affair been carried through at one time. This was especially the case with the Munshis on the north bank, with whom fighting occurred in 1900. After a long African experience I have come to the conclusion that the most humane method, when once fighting has become inevitable (as in the present case), and when all peaceful methods have failed, is to carry through the whole affair at one time, and not piece-meal. The instructions now issued to Colonel Hasler are, however, not in this sense.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

No. 13.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.45 p.m., March 15, 1906.)

TELEGRAM.

March 12. Troops concentrated at Sokoto under the command of Goodwin engaged rebels March 10. So-called Mahdi killed. Enemy fought courageously; Gallagher, Northern Nigeria Regiment, severely wounded arm. Other casualties not yet reported. None killed. Left free to deal with Gando (and) Hadeija. Loyal conduct of native chiefs with these exceptions throughout Protectorate, especially Sokoto, very striking. Troops from Munshi have arrived at Zungeru completely successful. Little fighting; tribes implicated in

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* No. 1. † No. 4. ‡ No. 5. § No. 6.

attack submitted; fifty captives released; casualties on our side Thornton, Northern Nigeria Regiment, slightly wounded; casualties amongst enemy about fifty. I am allowing overdue officers to go on leave at once. Propose to send back Lagos Battalion, West African Frontier Force, at once. If you concur, telegraph "Yes." Local forces considered amply sufficient for completion of operations.—LUGARD.

No. 14.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received March 16, 1906.)

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
Zungeru, February 14, 1906.

MY LORD,

IN continuation of my despatch of the 7th instant,* relative to the attack on Abinsi by the Munshi tribe, I have the honour to summarise in brief a report I have to-day received from the Resident, Mr. Gowers, an officer in whom I place much reliance.

2. The results of his investigations go to show that differences existed between the Jukum and Hausa sections at Abinsi, and Mr. Smith, Assistant Resident, was actually on his way from Ibi to adjust these at the time that the outbreak occurred. It originated in a petty dispute between a Hausa woman and Jukum man, which it was agreed should be settled by ordeal—a fowl being the object selected as a test—the woman lost and refused to redeem her pledge; the man attempted to detain her child, whereupon she struck him, and he then stabbed her. The Jukum chief of the town ordered his arrest, with a view to bringing the case before the Provincial Court, but the Jukums refused to obey their chief; the Hausas then endeavoured to effect the arrest, and a faction fight occurred. The Hausas occupied the Niger Company's enclosure, and the Jukums were getting the worst of it. A wounded Jukum then went to the neighbouring Munshi villages and asked their assistance. They have some chronic differences with the Hausas, who resent the frequent outrages upon traders. The Munshis from both banks came in great numbers and overpowered the Hausas. Mr. Gowers estimates the number of deaths at about 100, half of which occurred by women and children being driven into the river and drowned; amongst the killed was the wife of the Niger Company's clerk. Probably about 30 captives still remain in the hands of the Munshis. After much discussion next day it was decided by the Munshis to loot the Company's store, which was razed to the ground.

3. After much enquiry, Mr. Gowers gives it as his opinion that any extensive combination against the expedition is most unlikely. In this connection I have received the following telegram from Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler, Commanding the force:—

> "From what I hear honestly believe that we could traverse the whole of the Munshi country with little or no opposition. It seems thousand pities not to do it with strong force here. Am attempting surprise of four small towns near here to-night, and proceed 13th February to Massaba and Gidan-Kana, where great deal of loot said to have been taken. Expect to be away from here about ten days. Gowers thinks it necessary for safety of navigation of Benue to traverse both banks on the way down. I therefore propose to do so."

4. In my opinion the state of affairs in Eastern Bassa is such as calls for immediate action. The tribes in this district have, ever since the death of Captain O'Riordan, been in a state of unrest, and are reported to have been arming themselves for a conflict, by importing revolvers, &c., from Southern Nigeria. A constant traffic in arms, and in slaves and trade liquor takes place over this frontier,

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* No. 12.

which I am powerless to suppress until effective measures have been taken to overcome the opposition of the Okpotos. I have been only too glad to leave both the Munshis and the Okpotos alone for some years past, but it would appear that the matter can no longer be neglected, and I fear that, if nothing is done now, a conflict may be forced upon us later on. The expense of placing a strong force in the field has been incurred, and I would submit, for Your Lordship's consideration, that it would be advisable for the expedition to traverse the piece of country between the Katsena River and the Bassa Province, and to finally put an end to this unrest and source of danger, especially among the Okpotos situated near longitude 8°.

The Okpotos are watching the result of the Munshi aggression, and I fear lest their hostility may take a more decidedly aggressive line if they find that their present attitude is ignored. If you should concur in the advisability of this course of action with a view to checking the illicit traffic in slaves, liquor, and arms, I should be glad if you would convey your concurrence to me by telegram, in order that I may have time to communicate it to Colonel Hasler before the expedition withdraws.

5. The Acting Resident in Bassa reports as follows (in his last report to hand), regarding the illicit traffic to which I have alluded:—

> "This district containing Aiyangba, Meeka, Ankpah, Lafia, &c., &c., is in a very bad state indeed, and nothing, I think, is possible until it is thoroughly 'broken' and a garrison left there for several years. At present, murder, highway robbery, saaswood poisoning, kidnapping, and slave dealing are flourishing, the aliens residing there are doing a large trade in the latter. Revolvers and ammunition, gin, and powder are being freely imported from Southern Nigeria; these articles and slaves are sold in the open market at Biradu and Ogugu, which towns are both on or near the Loko-Ogrugru slave route. . . . At Ogugu, Zackari was present when the headman died, and saw two slaves killed and buried with him as a sacrifice. . . . Zackari reports that large numbers of revolvers and ammunition for same are being imported from Ogrugru and Southern Nigeria by land to the Southern Okpoto district; he brought me in a revolver, a quite useful weapon, 24 rounds of ·303, a soldier's blanket, and a pull-through."

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

No. 15.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received March 23, 1906.)

Government House, Northern Nigeria, Zungeru,
February 21, 1906.

MY LORD,

IT is with the deepest sorrow that I have the honour to confirm my telegram of 16th instant* to you, reporting a disaster at Sokoto. About 7 p.m. on 15th instant, I received a telegram as follows from the Sokoto line-head at Ambrusa:—

> "Copy of urgent letter just received from Jega. Jega detachment urgently required at Sokoto, as whole of C Company, Mounted Infantry, defeated and annihilated at Satiru. Please wire His Excellency required at once to relieve Fort Sokoto here. Hillary and Scott, Residents, Blackwood, West African Frontier Force, are, I fear, killed. Dr. Ellis, severely wounded, Sergeant Slack, R.A., and myself and doctor only men remaining; most urgent. Signed, Gosling, Sergeant. Assistant Resident McAllister

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* No. 8.

and Jega detachment have left Jega for Sokoto. Harbord, Assistant Resident."

I replied asking by whom the force had been defeated, and whether the Emir of Sokoto was hostile. Captain Harbord replied that he had no idea. The line was kept open all night, and I later received the following telegram from Dr. Ellis, Medical Officer at Sokoto:—

"Line-head, Ambrusa, 15th February. 10 o'clock p.m. Just received this letter from Dr. Ellis, dated February 14th, 1906, 11.30 a.m. Please inform His Excellency that a new Mahdi has arisen at Sahra, 14 miles north of Sokoto; he was attacked this morning by troops here consisting of the Mounted Infantry and one Maxim. Regret to report serious reverse to our troops and loss of Maxim, and am afraid Blackwood, Officer Commanding, and Hillary and Scott, who accompanied expedition as political officers, all killed, and self severely wounded in the arm; at present thirty Mounted Infantry have been rallied, and they and the millimetre detachment now garrison Sokoto. Sergeants Slack, R.A., and Gosling, Mounted Infantry, are with me. Have notified Sarikin Muslimin that he must lend assistance; also Sarikin Tambowel, in men and kind. Trust shall be able to hold out if you send up Jega detachment immediately by forced marches. All police away from station, having been sent to guard Major Burdon, who is on his way down. Please hasten Jega detachment. Ellis, Medical Officer, Sokoto. Harbord."

2. At Ambrusa there were four Europeans—Captain Harbord, Assistant Resident, Captain Jones, District Engineer, in charge of construction, and Dawson and Lawrence, R.E., telegraph constructors. I had heard that the Emir of Gando was hostile to Europeans, and the Emir of Sokoto had, I think, already recommended or concurred in his deposition. In these circumstances the four Europeans appeared to be in an unsafe position at Ambrusa (the capital of Gando), and I directed them to fall back on the pagan and very friendly state of Argungu, and there to obtain some native levies, if possible, to enable them, in case of necessity, to relieve the Europeans in Sokoto Fort. They themselves considered this the best course, and they left next day at about mid-day with this intention. This, of course, cut off telegraphic communication, and I have had no news whatever since that date.

3. Meanwhile, in reply to Dr. Ellis's summons, the detachment of 25 infantry at Jega started at 3 a.m., and on passing through the large walled town of Tambawel, they were joined by 150 native horsemen, a fact which shows the friendly disposition of at least a section of the people, and I have no personal doubt but that the Emir of Sokoto will be found to be loyal and friendly too. It may be that he also has been defeated by the Mahdi.

4. In addition to the Europeans who have been named, there were Mr. Esmonde, District Superintendent of Police, and Mr. Vertue, Assistant Resident, of whom I have no news at all. Major Burdon had left Sokoto *en route* for Zungeru three days before the occurrence, and Captain Ruxton had left Ambrusa for Zungeru the day before the occurrence.

5. The absence of the bulk of the troops in the Munshi country, and of so many of the senior officers, was unfortunate. I at once sent news by code telegram to Kano and Zaria, instructing them to take all precautions, and send out native spies to ascertain the news. In both cases the Residents sought the advice of the Emirs, who loyally responded. These Emirs have everything to fear from a Mahdi. It was a part of the singular ill-fortune which seemed to attend this crisis, that at Kano Dr. Cargill was just recovering from a severe attack of blackwater fever, and was about to be invalided; while at Zaria Captain Orr had left to inspect his Wushishi district, and to consult with me at Zungeru on some questions.

6. I felt it to be my duty to leave no possible resource untried, for I was—and still am—wholly in ignorance of the power which could have annihilated a whole company of Mounted Infantry—reported to be exceptionally well trained—or of the effect throughout the country of this signal success on the part of the Mahdi. I

therefore at once (16th) telegraphed to the Governor of Lagos, asking if he could assist me with any troops, but apparently, owing to the action of a native operator at Ogbomosho, my telegram lay in that office undespatched. I telegraphed again on 17th, and on 19th received a reply from Sir W. Egerton, informing me of the despatch of 250 Lagos troops by sea.

7. At the same time (night of 15th, despatched early 16th) I sent instructions to Colonel Hasler (by telegram to Loko, thence by canoe to Abinsi) to withdraw his force, leaving the smallest number of troops necessary to ensure safety of the Benue, and to return with all speed. To this telegram I have had as yet no reply, but I received to-day telegrams dated 17th and 19th reporting that the Munshis had so far submitted almost without resistance, and had given up their captives. Colonel Hasler was to have been absent from Abinsi only ten days, but I regret to say that in this telegram he informed me he was going further south, and would not be back at Abinsi at the time he had previously notified me.

8. I summoned 100 rifles at once from Lokoja, being practically all the really serviceable troops there. These arrived here to-day, and leave to-morrow under Major Cockburn for Kano, with a Maxim and ammunition.

9. On the 16th I despatched 75 rifles from here under Captain Gallagher to Kontagora, where they will be joined by 75 more. Major Goodwin, the senior officer present in Zungeru, is an officer in whom I place especial confidence. I therefore placed him in command of this force for the relief of Sokoto, but he remained here to assist me in taking all the necessary military steps, and galloped through to Kontagora [90 miles] in a day, overtaking Captain Gallagher. The force of 150 rifles left Kontagora yesterday (20th), making for Banaga, which is on the direct route to Sokoto. Major Goodwin will send out scouts, and I have left him full discretionary powers. If he gets no news that the Mahdi is crossing his front, and marching on Kano, he will push on with all haste to Sokoto. If, however, he finds that the enemy in force is moving on Kano, he will probably fall back on Zaria, and the two garrisons of Zaria and Kano will oppose the Mahdi's advance.

10. Meantime I hear that Hadeija, which has long contained a discontented faction, is assuming an aggressive demeanour; while the Honourable O. Howard reports another incipient Mahdi in the old centre of fanaticism, near Burmi. I trust that this latter matter is not in any way serious, and I have ordered the Dumjeri Company of Mounted Infantry to reinforce Hadeija. It would have been better for this place to have been dealt with long ago, since it forms a danger on our flank whenever any crisis may occur elsewhere. I have always considered it a menace. Though I believe the Emir himself desires to be friendly, a number of powerful slaves and others desire war.

11. Such is the situation at the moment. The defeat at Sokoto baffles all surmise. Not only has the Sultan always been more than friendly, but a report from Major Burdon (received on the same day as the news of this reverse) informs me of the constantly growing confidence of the peasantry, who now salute Europeans with smiling faces in a way they never did formerly, and military officers say that it is a pleasure to serve in that province, because of the courtesy and the cordiality of all the people. I have news that though the crops are most abundant throughout the whole Protectorate this year, there is a famine due to blight in the single district north of Sokoto (Godabawa), and it appears to be there that the Mahdi has arisen. It would also seem that one cause for the reverse may be the unreliability of the Mounted Infantry rifles, which I reported to you immediately on my arrival in the Protectorate in connection with next year's estimates. This is the first serious reverse suffered by the West African Frontier Force since it was raised. I am still in complete ignorance of the nature and extent of the hostile movement, but, in view of this initial reverse, I have regarded the matter very seriously, and have taken the precautions I have described, and which I trust you will approve.

12. I have this evening, late, received your telegram informing me that Colonel Morland is at Sierra Leone, and asking whether I desire the return of Colonel Lowry-Cole and other officers. I have, in consequence, telegraphed for Colonel Morland, as he is so close, asking him to telegraph date of his departure, in order

that I may inform him at an intermediate port, should the affair have "fizzled out.' There is no necessity at the present stage, I think, to recall Colonel Lowry-Cole, and, though I much wish he were here at the moment, I trust that the difficulty may be over before he could arrive from England.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

No. 16.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received March 23, 1906.)

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
MY LORD, Zungeru, February 22, 1906, 4.30 p.m.

THIS moment, as the mail is leaving, I have received news by telegram from Major Burdon, who has returned to Sokoto. He does not inform me whether the death of the three officers is confirmed, from which I fear that no doubt remains. I have telegraphed to ask. Nor does he throw any light on the cause of the disaster. In brief his news is that the Jega detachment has reached Sokoto safely; also the party from line-head, and Captain Ruxton is safe and marching towards Kontagora. He does not allude to Esmonde or Vertue. The Marafa of Sokoto marched against the rebels with 3,000 men and every prospect of success, but at the last moment his following refused to fight. Major Burdon does not expect any attack, and is confident in his powers of resistance if any were made. The supplies of ammunition are good. He had apparently sent down the operator to re-open communication with me by telegram from Ambrusa. Two local chiefs, Tambawel and Yabo, are acting in conjunction with us and maintaining the outer line of scouts; both, he says, are "staunch men." The refusal of the Sokoto levies to follow their chief into action is very unaccountable, and will, I fear, greatly increase the prestige of the Mahdi. The receipt of this news has determined me to send Major Cockburn to reinforce Major Goodwin instead of to Zaria.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD
High Commissioner.

No. 17.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received March 30, 1906.)

[*Answered by No.* 24.]

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
MY LORD, Zungeru, February 28, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatches of 21st and 22nd February,* relative to the reverse at Sokoto, I have the honour to report as follows. Major Burdon's earlier telegrams were received by me subsequent to those the substance of which I detailed in my last despatch; from these I learn as follows:—

Major Burdon apparently received the news of the reverse almost immediately, and hurried back to Sokoto on the 15th, with Messrs. Vertue and Esmonde. He

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* Nos. 15 and 16.

reports that the cause of disaster was that the Mounted Infantry horses bolted when firing began, and broke the square. The soldiers ran after the horses and then bolted; the white men were cut down by the enemy when trying to rally their men. Messrs. Hillary, Scott, and Blackwood were killed, Dr. Ellis wounded, and 25 soldiers killed and 2 wounded. The remainder were quite demoralised. He adds that it was in no sense an organised rising against Government, but a sudden fanatical outbreak against all authority, white or black; and that the Sultan and chiefs of Sokoto were co-operating loyally to suppress it. The head of the rising is one Mallam Isa, son of a man who just two years ago declared himself a Mahdi at this same little village of Satiru. On the 13th he rose and called on the neighbouring village of Tsomo to follow him; they refused, and he attacked them, and killed 12 men and burnt the place. Mr. Hillary attempted to arrest him "peacefully, if possible, but with a strong escort." The disaster followed. On the 16th Major Burdon reported that 10,000 adherents had joined Mallam Isa, who, however, had not declared himself a Mahdi. He summoned the Sultan of Sokoto to join him. but his letter was treated with scorn.

2. The next news was contained in the telegrams already reported to you in my despatch of February 22nd,* viz., that the Sokoto army had refused to fight when led by their war chief, Marafa, against the enemy; and that the chiefs of Tambawel and Yabo had come forward to help us. At this time (February 17th) Major Burdon had seven Europeans in the fort (viz., himself, Messrs. Vertue and McAllister, Assistant Residents, Dr. Ellis, and Sergeants Slack, Gosling, and O'Donohue), and there were five men at or near line-head (Captains Harbord and Jones, and Constructors Dawson, Lawrence, and Wright). The troops consisted of 11 gunners, 58 mounted infantry, and 28 infantry (Jegga detachment), total 97 rank and file, with a 75-millimetre gun, and 36 police. Next day Captain Harbord came in from Argungu with 32 more police. Argungu was entirely loyal, and the line-head party were there. Major Burdon felt quite safe with ample provisions, water, &c., in case of attack. The native horsemen of Tambawel and Yabo were doing outpost duty as scouts.

3. In consequence of this news, I diverted Major Cockburn's reinforcement (which was proceeding to Zaria in case of an eastward movement by the Mahdi), and directed him to follow Major Goodwin with all haste to Sokoto. He left Kontagora on 27th with 120 rifles and 6 officers, accompanied by Mr. Goldsmith (Resident) and Captain Johnson (Assistant Commissioner of Police).

4. On February 20th Major Burdon telegraphed that all was well and the position improving; two more trusted chiefs had joined in defending the fort, and were occupying villages for a distance of three miles round. The Mallam's following was deserting, and Major Burdon's chief anxiety seemed to be lest he should escape before reinforcements arrived to avenge the deaths of the three officers. Another and very important sub-chief of Gando had offered his services, and Argungu was, as always, intensely loyal and ready to join us at once.

5. Seeing that the news from Zaria and Kano was entirely satisfactory, the Emirs most loyal, and no news of the advance of the Mahdi eastwards, I allowed Major Green with two companies of Mounted Infantry from Kano to start for Sokoto on 25th, reinforcing Kano by an infantry detachment from the pagan district of Katchia. On the same day I heard news that the French had suffered a reverse not far from our frontier in Gando, and one or two officers had been killed, but other troops had immediately crushed the rising and burnt Gaia. I do not know the date of this occurrence, but it may have been prior to the rising in Sokoto, and the immediate cause of it.

6. By 26th the news had apparently reached Nupe from native sources, and I received a telegram from the Emirs as follows:—"The news I hear from Sokoto is bad. I am very troubled. I wish to offer all assistance, armed horsemen if required. Many salutations to my friend.—Momedu Etsu, Nupe." The Resident told me that the Emir was greatly upset. From Kano, Bauchi, and Zaria I heard that the Emirs had similarly been most prompt in demonstrating their loyalty. The last named

* No. 16.

at the very first news publicly declared that he had sworn loyalty to me on the Koran, and was not going back on his oath under any circumstances. These proofs of the general feeling in the country have been extremely encouraging at a time which could not but cause anxiety, owing to the initial tragedy, and the uncertainty connected with it.

7. As I write, news has just come in from Sokoto, dated February 26th (the last being February 20th), the purport of which I have transmitted to you by telegram. It is to the effect that no hope whatever remains that anyone of the three officers survives. That everyone else is safe. The Sokoto forces have apparently surrounded the rebels, who are about 5,000 strong, and are fortifying their position by digging pits. Mallam Isa is reported to have died of wounds, and the head of the rebels is now a man named Mallam Dan Makaifa, " who is said to have murdered three French officers in Zaberma a few months ago." This may refer to the report alluded to in paragraph 5. His adherents are mostly fugitive slaves, and I suppose some outlaws from French territory. The native chiefs were all absolutely loyal with the exception of Gando, who was utilising the opportunity to catch slaves.

8. From Bauchi the news has not been quite so reassuring. I said, in paragraph 10 of my former despatch,* that Mr. Howard had reported unrest in the old centre of fanaticism around Burmi. This would appear to be entirely unconnected with the Sokoto disturbance, which more recent news shows to have had little of the religious element in it, though its leader, Mallam Isa, was the son of the man who had formerly called himself a Mahdi, and continued success might easily have consecrated the cause and given it a religious complexion. In Bauchi, however, the unrest was due to religious causes. A Mallam had begun to preach the extermination of all infidels, and declared that he was the precursor of the true Mahdi, who would appear in a month's time. Mr. Howard, by prompt action, seized this man, and he is now a prisoner. A second shortly appeared, and began to tamper with our troops. He also was seized, and the Emir of Bauchi and his Native Council condemned him to death, and he was hung. But the principal preacher is yet another man, who is still at large. The place proclaimed for the concentration to await the Mahdi is Bima, near Burmi, where the fighting against the fanatical Tejani Sect took place in 1903. I have, therefore, ordered up a company from the Munshi force at once to reinforce or relieve the company at Nafada. It is now on its way. Mr. Howard's prompt action has, for the moment, put a stop to the trouble, which may, however, break out again at any moment.

9. As Hadeija is only a short distance north of this focus of fanaticism—which I think may not improbably be caused by emissaries from the Senussi—I requested your sanction to deal with that matter without delay, and if the troops at Sokoto are successful in wiping out the rebellion there, they will be concentrated on Hadeija, and be ready in case of any further developments in the Burmi district.

10. I gather from your telegrams that accounts have appeared in the English press, which have caused anxiety to relatives, and I have, therefore, reported very fully to you on the whole matter. The present position is that Major Goodwin should reach Sokoto to-day or to-morrow with 150 rifles and a Maxim. Major Green should arrive with two companies Mounted Infantry on or about March 4th, and Major Cockburn on March 8th or 9th with 120 more and a Maxim. Thus, with the Sokoto garrison, there will be a force of 573 troops and 70 police, with a total of about 44 white men (including civilians). When it is considered that part of this force marched from Lokoja, a distance by land alone greater than the length of England (about 400 by land and 80 by water), and that the concentration has been effected in spite of the absence of so strong a force in Munshiland in a period of three weeks from the date of the reverse, I think Your Lordship will concur that great credit is due to the officers and men.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

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* No. 15.

No. 18.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received April 4, 1906.)

[*Answered by No.* 24.]

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
MY LORD, Zungeru, March 7, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatches relative to the reverse at Sokoto, I have the honour to forward a full report from Major Burdon of the whole circumstances of this sad affair.

2. From this it appears clear that the rising was instigated by an outlaw from French territory named Dan Makafo, who gathered together a band of malcontents and runaway slaves, and forced Mallam Isa, the son of a man who had previously (in 1904) declared himself a Mahdi, to head the rising. Isa was at first reported to have declared himself a Mahdi, but this now appears to be doubtful, though it is possible that Dan Makafo's object in going to Satiru, and placing Isa in command, was to utilise any religious influence he might have. His following consisted of a rabble without any arms except spears, axes, and hoes, and they appear to have had no guns and but few bows and arrows.

3. The prompt suppression of such an affair should have offered no difficulty, but it would seem that a series of mistakes were made, which ended in a complete disaster. In the first place Mr. Hillary, in his anxiety to avoid bloodshed, rode ahead and shouted to the people that he had not come to fight but to settle the cause of discontent. Lieutenant Blackwood, apparently not considering Mr. Hillary's action to be safe, ordered his men to gallop forward, and altogether lost touch with his Maxim, which had already been left a mile or more in rear. When the enemy began to charge, Mr. Hillary still did not at once retire to the square, possibly thinking he could still stop the fighting. This led Lieutenant Blackwood into the disastrous mistake of endeavouring to advance his square at the critical moment, and of counter-ordering his command to dismount, an order which was apparently only heard by some of the men. At this moment the civil officers rejoined the square which was in a state of complete confusion, and almost simultaneously the enemy reached it. The only course which in my opinion could have saved the situation at such a crisis would have been to order the men to abandon their horses altogether, but it is said by some that the contrary order was given, viz., to "stand to the horses." The animals were already loose, and as the men ran to catch them instead of facing the enemy, the rout was complete.

4. The British officers all did their utmost to attempt to rally the men, but without success. Messrs. Hillary and Scott and Lieutenant Blackwood, overpowered by numbers, fell fighting. Dr. Ellis was wounded by a spear thrust in the right shoulder and was fainting from loss of blood. Sergeant Gosling, with five native soldiers, got him on a horse and retired slowly, meeting the Maxim in the hands of the enemy on their way. Another party of six retired independently under the native sergeant-major, the rest appeared to have bolted panic stricken, while 25 were killed.

5. The village chiefs on the way back to Sokoto gave the party every assistance, lending horses, and conveying the message sent by Dr. Ellis to call the detachment at Jega, a message of the utmost importance which enabled that reinforcement to start at once, and which was also sent on to line-head at Ambrusa and gave me the first news of the disaster. A Sokoto chief who had accompanied the troops had already sent back news to Sokoto, and when Dr. Ellis and Sergeant Gosling arrived at the fort they found the Serikin Mussulmin's and the Waziri's own sons assembling with their followers for the protection of the fort. Major Burdon emphasises the loyal action of the Sultan on this occasion. He had heard that all Europeans were killed; he supposed that Major Burdon had gone beyond recall, and Mr. Hillary had sent Messrs. Esmonde and Vertue after him (prior to the action) in order to inform him of the rising and protect him with a party of police. The Sultan therefore supposed that only one white man—Sergeant Slack, R.A., who had been left in the fort with the 75-millimetre gun—was still alive. The slightest indecision on

his part would have resulted in the populace going over to the winning side; but he instantly rallied to the protection of the fort and the one white man whom he had never seen. His loyalty was reflected in the action of the minor chiefs, who came in with their followers and scouted day and night for three miles round the fort, while the Marafa—the leader of the Sokoto forces—was most anxious to attack the rebels at once.

6. The return of Major Burdon gave an entirely new complexion to affairs. His influence and immense popularity with the native chiefs, and his sound dispositions, immediately rendered any further disaster impossible, and it only remained for him to await the reinforcement which he knew would not lag on the road in order to make a certainty of taking signal vengeance on the rebels who had attacked while Mr. Hillary was proclaiming that he had not come to fight. I have already described to you the steps taken by myself on receipt of the news. The positive statement that it was a new Mahdi who had defeated our troops, together with an entire absence of any cause which could account for the disaster except a most extensive rising, compelled me to take a very serious view of the situation, and every garrison, at Kano, Zaria, Bauchi, Katsena, &c., was warned, and all precautions taken. I was myself wholly convinced of the loyalty of Sokoto, and of all his principal chiefs, but I feared that the Mahdi who could "annihilate" our force with its Maxim and 75-millimetre gun would find little difficulty in disposing of any resistance on the part of Sokoto. The chief of Gando I knew to be personally disaffected—he has always been so—and the disquieting reports from Hadeija, and from Mr. Howard in Bauchi, who informed me of a propaganda for a coming Mahdi in the old centre of fanaticism at Burmi, added to the difficulty of the situation.

7. The whole of the mobile force available in ordinary circumstances was away on the Benue, consequent upon the attack of the Munshi tribe upon the Niger Company's station there, but in spite of this a force of 573 rank and file with two Maxims, and a total of 44 British officers, should be in Sokoto to-morrow. The first reinforcement of 150 rifles arrived on March 1st, and Major Goodwin, who is in command, has decided to await the remainder before attacking. I should have news of the result in a day or so.

8. Meanwhile Colonel Dobell's column, which I recalled from the Munshi country, arrived here yesterday, and the other column is due in a day or so, and the Lagos troops arrived two days ago. So that had events proved to be as serious as they first seemed to be, I should have had a powerful force to deal with the situation. If, as I hope, the affair at Sokoto is finally settled in the next day or two, I shall have ample force to deal with the situation at Bauchi and Hadeija, and it will probably be unnecessary to retain the Lagos troops.

9. I would desire to ask Your Lordship to take note of the admirable work done by Major Burdon, who hurried back to Sokoto through a disturbed district, and by his tact, ability, and courage restored confidence and assured the safety of all.

10. Major Burdon calls my attention to "the splendid work done by the three Europeans, Dr. Ellis, Sergeant Gosling, and Sergeant Slack, for the rallying of the force and the defence of Sokoto." The two former he considers "displayed courage and presence of mind in their retirement, and Sergeant Slack showed both devotion and discretion in the course he took." Conspicuous gallantry was shown by Private Moma Wurrikin, who saved Dr. Ellis's life by giving him a horse, and tried to save Mr. Scott's in the same way, in both cases before trying to catch a horse for himself, keeping his head and shooting with great coolness the while, and also by Private Moma Zaria, who returned towards the advancing enemy and saved a dismounted comrade. Both these men again distinguished themselves in the Marafa's attack, when they went as escort to Mr. Vertue, and they saved the Marafa's life. I would recommend them to Your Lordship for the medal for distinguished conduct in the field. Copy of letter from the Commandant regarding them is attached.

11. The conduct of the Sultan of Sokoto, and of the Marafa, as well as of the chiefs of Tambawel and Yabo and the Maijin Dadi of Sokoto, deserves the highest commendation for the loyalty displayed by them, and the efforts they have made to support us. If Your Lordship should think it feasible to recommend to His Majesty the recognition in any tangible way of the action of the Sultan who, as head of the Moslems of this part of Africa, is a man of great importance, the effect would no

doubt be good. His Majesty might perhaps be graciously pleased to bestow upon him the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

The Resident and Acting Officer Commanding Troops, Sokoto, to High Commissioner.

Your Excellency, Sokoto, February 21, 1906.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the rising at Satiru, the action fought there on February 14th, and the subsequent events to the present day. I forward herewith the report of the survivors of the action, in which Lieutenant F. E. Blackwood, Mounted Infantry, commanding, Mr. Resident Hillary and Mr. Assistant Resident Scott, Political Officers, were killed and Dr. Ellis wounded. The deplorable loss sustained has already been reported by telegrams from Dr. Ellis on the 14th; and I have sent telegrams daily since the 15th to report developments.

2. I left Sokoto on the evening of February 12th. I was caught up at Dabegin Lafia, about 25 miles out, at 1 a.m. on the 14th, by Assistant Resident Vertue, who had been sent with D.S.P. Esmonde and twenty-four police for my protection, in case the area of the disturbance should spread to my line of march. My escort for the march had consisted of five police. As a matter of fact the disturbed district was some distance from my road, which was quite safe.

3. I had heard of the disturbance on the afternoon of the 13th, as an inter-village fight, and had sent in word to Mr. Hillary. I considered it a matter of no very great importance. Mr. Hillary's letter, brought by Mr. Vertue, took a serious view, stated that he was going to deal with the matter at once by arresting (peaceably if possible, but with force at his back) the leader, and begged me not to think of turning back to Sokoto, as I might be cut off.

4. As Mr. Hillary was, from his letter, starting at the time I read the letter, and as I was some twenty-five miles across country from the scene of action, while Mr. Hillary was only fourteen, I could do nothing to co-operate, so stayed at Dabegi to await further report. Needless to say, no anticipation of failure ever entered my head. No report arrived, but at night a messenger sent by the Sarikin Baura of Denge, ten miles to my north, informed me that the troops had attacked Satiru, had retired without breaking it, and had lost four soldiers, bodies left on the field. I immediately decided to return, and started back at 3 a.m. Soon after starting I was met by a letter from Dr. Ellis reporting the extent of the disaster.

5. I made all preparations for fighting my way back to Sokoto, but was greatly reassured on reaching Denge to find the cordiality of the Sariki unchanged, and to hear his assurance that the road was open and the rebels not moving out of their town. They had burnt several villages round Satiru for refusing to join them; and all the villagers along my route were fully armed and prepared to resist such attacks. I was well greeted everywhere, and as far as I could judge the return of the three white men and the police was welcomed with relief. I received the usual guards of honour from the headmen.

6. At Kwonnawa, four miles south of Sokoto, I was delighted to find the Marafa, who had come in from Godabawa, twenty-five miles north of Sokoto, with the utmost speed on receipt of the news. He had volunteered to Sergeant Slack to go straight against Satiru; and on being asked to await my return, had gone on to meet me and take up a position from which he could observe and act, without being close enough to give his troops the chance of slave catching.

7. I was met on my arrival by the Sarikin Muslimin and his chiefs, who were evidently greatly affected by the disaster, and to whom my return was visibly the most tremendous relief. Their personal loyalty could not be questioned, nor their eagerness to co-operate for the defence of the fort and the suppression of the rebellion.

8. The following is the sequence of the events that occurred after my departure:—Prior to that not a hint of any trouble pending was known in Sokoto, though

I have reason to believe a suspicion of it existed in Bodinga on the evening of the 12th. On the afternoon of the 13th a report came through the Sarikin Muslimin to Mr. Hillary that a pretended Mahdi had arisen at Satiru and had burnt Tsomo, killing twelve men. He immediately sent off as above reported for my protection, and later, on confirmation of the report, decided to take action. Satiru is about 14 miles nearly due south of Sokoto, not far from Bodinga and Danchadi.

9. It will be remembered that in February, 1904, a similar self-styled Mahdi proclaimed himself in this same village of Satiru. He was arrested by my order by the Sarakin Muslimin (without Government interference and without disturbance), and died whilst awaiting trial by the Native Court (*vide* Reports 11 and 12, February and March, 1904). His supporters (amongst whom was this man) were released on taking oath on the Koran to keep the peace. The present man, Mallam Isa, is the son of the "Mahdi" of February, 1904. The latter, on proclaiming himself Mahdi, nominated his son "Annabi Isa" (the prophet Jesus). He has kept this name, and has not proclaimed himself Mahdi, as at first supposed.

10. He has, as his second, one Dan Makafo, who some months ago murdered (I believe) three Frenchmen in Zaberma. The French broke his following and thought they had killed him, but he got away disguised. I hear now that he went to Birnin Kebbi and thence to Gando (avoiding Ambrusa probably), and that in Gando he collected a large following and got them across unobserved to Satiru.

It is said to be he who has egged on Isa to this action. It must be carefully borne in mind that the present trouble is in no sense a rising of the country. It is a mere fanatical outburst on the part of a bigoted village headman and his immediate following. Had the procedure of February, 1904, been adopted I do not believe it would ever have been heard of except through the Native Court Reports. As far as I can learn, the adherents who at one time flocked to it were nearly all run-away slaves.

11. It is, I think, only a coincidence that the rising should have taken place just after my departure. But some native opinion says it is more than coincidence. My coming departure was long known of. It was known generally that I was to start on Sunday, the 11th. Had I done so I should have been well out of the way. It was only at the last minute, and because I was not ready to start, that I was forced to wait till Monday, and the change may not have been known in Satiru. I believe, however, that the synchronising of the date of the rising with my leaving was coincidence, not intention.

12. To continue the sequence of events:—At 3.30 a.m. on the 14th the following force marched out of Sokoto under the command of Lieutenant Blackwood, the sole military officer in the station: Sergeant Gosling and 69 native rank and file and two enlisted labourers (for led Maxim and ammunition horses), all Mounted Infantry; the Mounted Infantry Maxim under a native corporal; one gunner, medical orderly; Dr. Ellis, Medical Officer, and Messrs. Hillary, Acting Resident, and Scott, Assistant Resident, Political Officers. The force was accompanied by Mainasara, Political Agent, the Maijin Dadi of Sokoto, confidential messenger of the Sarikin Muslimin to the Resident, some native horsemen as guides, &c., a "horseboy" for each European, and one or two "boys." The Maxim gun was not ready when the force marched off, and came along behind independently. It never caught up the force or took part in the action.

13. Sergeant Slack, R.A., was left in charge of the fort, with 11 native rank and file R.A., 15 enlisted gun carriers and 12 native rank and file Mounted Infantry. He was the only European left in the station, and was ordered to hold himself in readiness to proceed with his gun to the scene of action, if required.

14. It is difficult to write an accurate description of an action that was a mere *mêlée*, especially when I was not present at it. But from the reports and from minute enquiry from Dr. Ellis, Sergeant Gosling, the native sergeant-major, and the surviving section leaders, I believe the following to be a fairly reliable account. The start was timed with the object of reaching Satiru at daybreak, but the town was not sighted till about 7.15 a.m. I attach a rough sketch of the scene of the fight. Satiru was seen at A, the top of a long gentle rise, at a distance of about a mile. From here the ground sloped down gently, with a steepish bit at B, to a marshy depression, now of course dry, in front of Satiru. Satiru was on the eastern

face of the rising ground on the opposite side of the valley, a large village straggling nearly north and south, composed of zana mat compounds, and surrounded by a mat fence.

15. At A the formation was changed from column of route (groups) to section column; and the advance guard, six men under Sergeant Gosling, was recalled. This advance guard was scouting about half a mile ahead, and had it remained in position would undoubtedly have given ample warning of the enemy's formation and intentions.

16. At C the column halted, I presume in the hope of allowing the Maxim, which was about a mile in rear, to catch up. Messrs. Hillary and Scott went forward with their political and native followers. Lieutenant Blackwood complained to Dr. Ellis of this action on their part, and as he did not halt long enough to allow the Maxim up, but advanced almost immediately at a gallop, I presume he felt obliged to subordinate military considerations to the safety of these officers.

17. At D the first sight of the enemy was obtained. They appeared to rise out of a depression in one or two orderly extended lines, footmen with five mounted leaders. They were evidently informed (men supposed to be scouts had been seen on the road) and prepared; and they appeared to have shown considerable tactical ability by concealing themselves until our force arrived within their striking distance, by the orderly way in which they were drawn up and charged, and by the apparently prearranged manner in which they passed the native soldiers unregarded and fastened themselves in groups on the Europeans. Their arms were some spears and bows and arrows, but mostly hoes, axes, and such agricultural implements.

18. Messrs. Hillary and Scott were then a long way in front, with their native following, within speaking distance of the enemy. Mr. Hillary was trying to carry out his intention of effecting the necessary arrests without fighting, and was calling out to the people, both himself and through his interpreter and staff, even when the enemy had begun to advance, that he had come to talk to them and not to fight. This is a point on which the loyal natives lay particular stress, regarding it as shameful for the Satiru people to have disregarded the proffered parley and to have attacked men who were assuring them that they had not come to fight.

19. Our force had arrived at E before the advance of the enemy was seen. The Political Officers were retiring, and Mr. Scott was near enough to warn the officer commanding of the impending charge. But Mr. Hillary was still at some distance. Lieutenant Blackwood immediately formed square, but as Mr. Hillary had not yet got in by the time the formation was completed he advanced the square to his assistance, thereby preparing the way for the subsequent disaster.

20.* The square formation needs explanation. The 1904 Mounted Infantry Drill Book lays down that square is to be formed from column, by closing to quarter column, dismounting in this formation and closing up the led horses to one-horse length from the section in front, the dismounted men doubling up to form square round the horses, the leading section forming the front face, the second the right face, the third the left face, the fourth the rear face. In this formation, while the men face in four directions, the horses all face to the front. It was, according to the native sergeant-major, this formation that was always taught and practised by the former officer commanding company, Captain MacDonnell.

21.* Lieutenant Blackwood, on taking over the company, about a month ago, according to the same authority, adopted and taught a new formation, that employed for forming an infantry square, in place of the above. The leading section formed the front face as usual; the next wheeled to the right, the third on reaching wheeling distance wheeled to the left, and the fourth on closing up went groups about; the men dismounted in the usual way and formed, each section in front of their horses. In this formation the horses of each section faced in the same direction as the section firing line. It was this evolution that Sergeant Gosling found in practice on joining the company on February 1st, and this formation that was adopted in the action of the 14th.

22. To resume the account of the action:—At E Lieutenant Blackwood gave the order "Form square," and the evolution was carried out as described in paragraph 21. But as the men were dismounting Lieutenant Blackwood called out, "Don't dismount, I want to advance." After this no detailed account is possible.

* See Enclosure 12 in No. 19, page 30.

Apparently some of the men remounted, those that were near enough to hear the order, and the order to advance was given. As no movement in square had ever been practised the flank faces did not know what to do, and instead of turning left and right to the front of the square, began to advance to their own fronts. The flank men of these faces nearest the front face naturally hung back and inclined towards the real front to keep touch with the advancing front face, and it was thus that the movement arose which is described by Dr. Ellis as a wheel. The rear face became deserted, the men of that section joining in the wheel of the flank faces. Dr. Ellis, Mr. Scott, and Sergeant Gosling were trying their best to push the flank faces back into square formation. The men towards the rear who had not heard the order to remain mounted were trying to scramble back into their saddles and the whole force was in a state of confusion when Lieutenant Blackwood, on Mr. Hillary's rejoining, finally ordered the force to halt, dismount, and open fire. The horses were not properly handed over, and immediately started to break loose; the enemy were on to the square before a quarter of the men could form up or open fire; the firing completed the horse stampede, and the men, who had never got into position, demoralised and mixed up amongst the enemy and plunging horses, broke and ran. If, as is believed, the order to stand to the horses was given, it may account for the run commencing, for the horses were loose and the men would have to run and catch them.

23. The square was fronting just south of west; the charge came from north of west and therefore fell on the right front corner of the square. It was on this corner that all the Europeans were collected except Sergeant Gosling, who had been sent by Lieutenant Blackwood to try and form up a rear face. Lieutenant Blackwood called on him to rally the men, a task which he and all other Europeans did their utmost to carry out, but without success. The only thing left was to try and mount and rally somewhere in rear. It was in the attempt to do this that Mr. Scott was killed and Dr. Ellis wounded. Lieutenant Blackwood had already been cut down, and Mr. Hillary was nowhere to be seen.

24. Sergeant Gosling, helped by Privates Moma Wurrikin (who, after doing all he could on the field, galloped off to Sokoto to call up Sergeant Slack and the gun, probably acting on previous orders from Lieutenant Blackwood), Arzuka Sokoto, Moma Zaria, Abdulai Beri Beri, and Mani Tcheribi, assisting the doctor, now nearly fainting from loss of blood, retired slowly to the north-east, facing about and firing as they went, and halting occasionally in hope of forming a rallying point for any survivors. Some way in rear they came across the Maxim in the hands of the enemy. The corporal, on seeing the attack, had got his gun into action, but before he could open fire had been attacked and driven off with the loss of his gun and one man. Sergeant Gosling, having helped Dr. Ellis to bind up his wound, eventually brought his party safe into Sokoto, beating off attacks for about an hour. The party was guided back to Sokoto by the headman of a village passed on the road. This headman also lent a dismounted soldier a horse and provided the messenger to Jega, mentioned below.

25. The Native Sergeant-Major Adamu Yola, who had been away from all Europeans on the left face of the square, retired along the road to the east of Sergeant Gosling's party, trying to rally stragglers. He eventually collected six men, and being cut off by the enemy from Sergeant Gosling, retired independently, fighting, towards Sokoto, eventually halting to await the arrival of the gun.

26. When about four miles from Sokoto, Sergeant Gosling, on Dr. Ellis's instructions, sent off the above-mentioned native with a letter to Mr. McAllister at Jega, asking him to report the disaster by wire and bring in the troops. This man, sent off about 11 a.m., reached Jega before mid-day, and Ambrusa at 5 p.m. next day. One of the satisfactory points that have been brought out by this unfortunate affair is the reliability of the men supplied by the Sarikin Muslimin, and even as in this case of casual natives, as messengers. In spite of the general unrest, and in some cases of open hostility on the part of the poorer classes, only one message, and that an unimportant one, has miscarried. Another satisfactory point is the way the missing horses have been caught and sent in. Over twelve such have been recovered through various village headmen.

27. In the meanwhile, Sergeant Slack had started out from the fort at 8.30 a.m. with his gun, having received news of the disaster and information that

the gun was required. He advanced, picking up stragglers and receiving contradictory accounts of the extent of the disaster, for about six miles. On hearing that the Maxim was captured, all Europeans killed, and the enemy advancing to attack, he returned to hold the fort, sending off the Maijindadi to the Sarikin Muslimin to ask for assistance.

28. The Maijindadi had already on his own initiative sent off from the field of battle to apprise the Sarikin Muslimin of the disaster, and even by the time that Sergeant Gosling and Dr. Ellis reached the fort (having come in by side roads), horsemen—the Sarikin Muslimin's and Waziri's own sons and the Sarikin Zamfara —were assembling for the protection of the fort. By 2 p.m. there were several hundred native horses patrolling to the front, forming an outpost screen round the fort; and urgent messages had been sent to every district headman to hasten to our support.

29. The Sarikin Muslimin thought that I had gone beyond recall. He knew two Europeans had gone after me, and the natural native idea would be that on hearing of the disaster both they and I would bolt south for safety. Whether he thought so or not I can't say, but I know the common folk did. He believed all the Europeans in the action were killed and all troops engaged had fled for good. And without a moment's hesitation he did his utmost—an utmost that would, I believe, have been effectual had the expected attack been attempted—to save the one European left, a sergeant whom he had never seen, and to keep the British flag flying in Sokoto. Had he shown the slightest indecision, I have no doubt but that the bulk of the "talakawa" (poor or unofficial classes) would at once have joined the enemy; many headmen would have followed suit, some voluntarily and others perforce, and instead of an isolated fanatical outbreak we should have had to meet a general rising. Had he even procrastinated, or confined himself to promises, the result would have been the same—the probable extermination of all Europeans in the Sokoto Province.

30. Sergeant Gosling and Dr. Ellis, on reaching the fort, had set themselves to preparing for defence or siege. Sergeant Slack, on his return, took command, and continued this task—food and water supply and the improvement of defences. All Government people were brought in, including the women of the native troops, in the hope that their presence might restrain the men from bolting; and all stores and records of importance. All Europeans remained on sentry all night. And I need not dilate on the anxiety they experienced, ignorant of the whereabouts of Messrs. Vertue, Esmonde, and myself, expecting an attack and convinced that if it occurred the gunners were the only troops that could be relied on to stand.

31. On my arrival, by the desire of Sergeant Slack and the remaining Europeans, I assumed executive command of the troops, wiring to Your Excellency for confirmation of my action. I also appointed Sergeant Slack to act as my adjutant, owing to his experience, energy, ability, and personal knowledge of the men. I have continued and added to the preparations for defence and siege; the well has reached water, there are sufficient provisions, and the fort is practically impregnable to *any* native attack, provided the men behind the parapet stay there. The garrison has been strengthened by the arrival of Mr. McAllister, Sergeant O'Donohue, and the Jega detachment; and of Captain Harbord and part of the Gando police detachment (the remainder being with the telegraph construction party at Argungu). I have done everything possible to restore the morale of the Mounted Infantry, I believe with some success. And I have been enabled by the zeal and untiring energy of all the Europeans to carry on a rigid system of outposts, guards, &c., which, though hardly necessary, owing to our present security, has been, I think, valuable as a lesson in war to the young soldiers of my garrison.

32. The situation on my arrival, according to all available information, appeared to demand immediate action. At a council of war with the other Europeans it was unanimously agreed that any unsupported move on our part would inevitably result in further disaster. The Mounted Infantry would not face the enemy again, the police were untried, and could hardly be counted a fighting force. The gun could not be endangered without an escort; and the handful of gunners, though absolutely dependable, could do nothing by themselves. Although report spoke of Mr. Hillary as a prisoner, we were forced to the conclusion that any attempt

to rescue him, besides probably leading to his immediate death, would result in the total loss of the fort and its garrison.

33. The Marafa, the acknowledged leader of the Sokoto forces, was most anxious to be allowed to attack, and was confident of his ability to annihilate the rebels. Such a course would appear to accentuate the loss of British prestige; but that appeared to me a lesser evil than the threatened spread of the rising. It was also a danger that I felt confident of my ability to cope with subsequently. After most careful consideration and discussion I therefore gave my consent to the attempt, especially as a sudden onslaught of horsemen appeared to me to be the only method that could give a possible prisoner the chance to escape.

34. Accordingly the Marafa, collecting all headmen who had arrived and all Sokoto and neighbouring chiefs, attacked Satiru on the morning of the 17th, with about 3,000 horse and foot. His own personal troops and those of the Sarikin Kebbi of Yabo had entered the town and were pressing forward fighting with every prospect of success, when the remaining troops deserted them and retired. These two chiefs were left in the lurch, and had several casualties amongst their retainers. They were forced to withdraw sullenly in rear of their retreating forces. The Marafa was only saved from falling into the enemy's hands by the gallantry of Privates Moma Wurrikin and Moma Zaria, Mounted Infantry, the men who so distinguished themselves on the 14th.

35. The Sarikin Muslimin and the Marafa had begged me to send a European to be present at the attack. The Marafa, especially, would hardly have dared to press the attack home without such support. The reason is natural. Without the presence of a European the Marafa, a strong man and therefore unpopular, would have been accused of fighting for his own glorification, and would also have been charged with the responsibility of every slave caught. He also believed that the presence of a European would tend to restrain the catching of slaves. I therefore sent out Mr. Vertue with a bodyguard of absolutely trustworthy natives under Kiari, who I knew from experience would answer for his safety with his own life, and with the two gallant soldiers above named. Mr. Vertue, in accordance with my emphatic orders, kept himself in absolute safety, and well out of reach of the fight, but on seeing the Marafa's danger he detached to his protection these two men. They achieved their task splendidly.

36. The true cause for this retirement and reverse will have to be enquired into later. It was believed at first to be treachery. It now appears to have been due to faulty dispositions. The Commander-in-Chief left his proper place to go nearer to the fight; and his not being seen when looked for is said to have caused a panic. Whatever be the cause, the reverse has in no way affected the staunchness of those chiefs I have always trusted, and if there *was* treachery, it serves to bring into greater prominence their unswerving loyalty. The native chiefs are now begging to be given the chance of wiping out the former disgrace; but there is now no need for desperate measures, and I will not sanction another native attempt. If the idea of treachery is true, it confirms my former opinion as to the sullen disaffection of the "talakawa," and will have served a very useful purpose.

37. There is nothing to do now except await the reinforcements for further action. The Marafa, with a fresh and more dependable force, is watching Satiru and trying to prevent the break-up of the rebels before punitive action can be taken. Further reliable chiefs have arrived and are occupying the villages between the fort and the enemy; and foremost amongst our allies is the Sarikin Tambawel. He is camped in the native barracks, and with the Sarikin Kebbi of Yabo finds a line of mounted patrols, of proved vigilance and efficiency, about a mile in front of our outpost line.

The Sarikin Tambawel had gone off towards Anka to bid me good-bye, and afterwards escorted Mr. McAllister from Jega, and so arrived too late for the Marafa's action on the 17th.

38. Information from women fugitives, and from a prisoner shot in the action of the 14th, and subsequently dead of his wounds, states that the rebels suffered considerably in our action, losing some thirty to forty killed and wounded. Amongst the latter was their leader, Mallam Isa, who died of his wounds on the 16th. The

leader is now Dan Makafo, who is trying to bolt, and is retained by force by the Satiru people to die with them for having led them into this trouble. Had it not been for the Marafa's attack the rebels would have melted on the 17th. Now that they know that the native chiefs are against them as well as the English, they realise the futility of trying to escape.

39. All native information refutes the early rumours of a white prisoner. All three Europeans are stated to have been killed in the action. Dr. Ellis saw Mr. Scott killed and Lieutenant Blackwood down and surrounded, and, therefore, not likely to have been taken alive. And Mr. Hillary's body with a spear through the heart was seen by a native in the affair of the 17th, a fact which bears out the native statement that he was killed in the charge. I have offered £10 reward for each white body that can be secured and brought in, and shall also give £1 reward for that of each soldier.

40. I hope my narrative will make clear to Your Excellency the splendid work done by the three Europeans, Dr. Ellis, Sergeant Slack, and Sergeant Gosling, for the rallying of the force and the defence of Sokoto. I consider that Sergeant Gosling took the only possible course in retiring when and as he did, that Dr. Ellis showed great self-command, in his wounded state, and that both displayed courage and presence of mind in their retirement; Sergeant Slack showed both devotion and discretion in the course he took; and the state of defence on my arrival was proof of the tremendous efforts made by all three, both for material safety and for the steadying of the shaken garrison. It is but negative praise to say that none of them lost their heads; but in the terrible position in which they found themselves, and after the strain of the morning's events, I think such a statement should count as more than negative.

41. I have already given the names of the Mounted Infantry soldiers who rallied to Sergeant Gosling, and I particularly bring to Your Excellency's notice Private Moma Wurrikin, who saved Dr. Ellis's life by giving him a horse, and tried to save Mr. Scott's in the same way, in both cases before trying to catch a horse for himself, keeping his head and shooting with great coolness the while; and also Private Moma Zaria, who returned towards the advancing enemy and saved a dismounted comrade.

42. And I cannot end without specially commending to Your Excellency the following Native Chiefs:—

Mohammadu Attahiru, Sarikin Muslimin, whose unhesitating support saved the Fort and kept the rising down to its present comparatively insignificant dimensions; and to whom is entirely due the support given by his headmen.

Mohammadu, Marafa of Godabawa, who made a gallant attempt to retrieve the disaster and put down the rising; and to whose persistence we owe much of our immunity as well the fact that there still remains an enemy to punish.

Shefu, Sarikin Tambawel, who escorted Mr. McAllister and his party in safety through very hostile districts on the 17th instant, and has since most efficiently undertaken the larger share of the advance-patrol system by which the Fort is protected. He also detached a trustworthy party for the discovery of Captain Ruxton and his protection if in danger.

Abubaker, Sarikin Kebbi of Yabo, who was, apparently, the only one of the Marafa's leaders who effectively supported him in the affair of the 17th, and who has since taken part of the patrol system for the Fort.

Osuman, Maijin-Dadi of Sokoto, who, by sending from the battlefield to warn the Sarikin Muslimin of the disaster, took the first step for the defence of the Station.

I have, &c.,
ALDER BURDON,
Resident and Acting Officer Commanding Troops,
Sokoto Province.

The MEDICAL OFFICER, Sokoto, to the RESIDENT, Sokoto Province.

SIR, Sokoto, February 16, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to write to you and to report to you the sequence of the unfortunate events that occurred on the 13th and 14th instants. During the evening of the 13th I received a note, marked "Urgent," from Mr. Resident Hillary, asking me to go to his hut and see him. I found him discussing a report which was subsequently verified by additional messengers, that a new Mahdi had set himself up at Satiru, south-west of Sokoto. Mr. Hillary determined to go out and to suppress the movement by using peaceful methods if possible, but in the event of the man absolutely refusing to give himself up, he determined to take some troops with him. He also considered it advisable for Mr. Assistant Resident Vertue and Captain Esmonde, D.S.P., and 24 police to follow Major Burdon, who had started two days previously and was passing by the disaffected district, for his protection in case of attack. Mr. Hillary's party started about 3.30 a.m. on the 14th instant, and consisted of five Europeans, viz.:—Messrs. Hillary and Scott, Political Officers; Lieutenant Blackwood and Sergeant Gosling, Mounted Infantry; and myself as Medical Officer, together with some 70 rank and file of the Mounted Infantry with a Maxim gun; and one gunner who was medical orderly. In addition, there were some seven or eight horseboys, the Mijin Dadi, Mainasara, the Political Agent, and some 18 natives as guides, &c., belonging to Sarikin Muslimin. We had expected to reach Satiru at daybreak, but did not get in sight of the town until about 7.15 a.m. We passed a hamlet called Somo, I believe—which the rebel had "broken" the day before, having killed 14 men and burnt two.

2. On arriving at the top of a ridge we saw the village of Satiru, a large one, situated on the top of the next ridge. It consisted of a good number of huts and had only zanna-mat walls round the compounds within it. Suddenly we saw a long line drawn up outside the village, in number between 2,000 and 2,500. Mr. Hillary went on ahead with Mr. Scott and the Political Agent, and was followed down the hill by Lieutenant Blackwood and the Mounted Infantry. When within some 800 yards of these men, we saw them all move forward. Mr. Hillary called out through his Agent to them, but instead of stopping they began running forward. Mr. Scott called out to Lieutenant Blackwood, "Look out, Blackwood, they are charging." On hearing this Lieutenant Blackwood immediately ordered the men to form a square, the horses were put inside on the rear face of the square, four horses being held by one man only. The men forming the square were some two yards apart. As Mr. Hillary was some distance in advance of the square, Lieutenant Blackwood gave the order to move forward, Sergeant Gosling being on the left flank and Mr. Scott and myself on the right flank, Lieutenant Blackwood being slightly in advance until Mr. Hillary had been overtaken, when he ordered a halt. Somehow, either the men did not hear the order or understand it, and the right flank began to wheel into line with the front face of the square. Mr. Scott and myself managed to get them back into their proper place, but then the horses, which had all along been restless, broke loose after firing started. As a consequence, just as the enemy charged (almost entirely on foot), the square was all broken and in a state of hopeless confusion. Lieutenant Blackwood, apparently, ordered all his men to "Stand to their horses." This was very difficult, as a hand-to-hand fight was going on. Those men who catch a horse, whether it was their own or not was immaterial, got on horses and bolted for all they were worth. Mr. Scott and myself tried hard to stop them, and I heard Sergeant Gosling order them to stop, but they appeared absolutely panic stricken, and fired their rifles into the air in front of them as they rode away. I never saw Mr. Hillary again. I saw Lieutenant Blackwood some 50 yards away lying on the ground with the enemy round him. Mr. Scott was at some 30 yards to my left trying to mount his horse. I managed to catch a horse and was going to mount when some men ran at me. One killed my horse with a spear, and a second one I shot with my revolver. The third lunged at me with a spear and stuck it in my right shoulder. A trooper, Moma Wurriki, then came up and shot the man who wounded me, and then caught me a horse and lifted me into the saddle. The same trooper then rushed across to Mr. Scott, who had got free from the enemy for a few moments but could not catch his horse which had broken loose, caught the horse and gave him it and then mounted his own. On Mr. Scott trying to mount, a man thrust at him and knocked him back off the

horse, and he was then attacked by several men on the ground. Sergeant Gosling then came up from the right and helped me to keep in my saddle, assisted by Private Arzika Sokoto, and, afterwards, put on a tourniquet and stopped the artery bleeding. As I was quite unable to mount, Moma Wurrikin undoubtedly saved my life, and tried his best to save Mr. Scott's, shooting at the enemy as he went to and fro. Sergeant Gosling had managed to collect five men and with them we rode up the hill hotly pursued by the enemy. It was intended at first to take the Maxim, which was placed on the rising ground, and to get into a hut and try to remain there so as to collect some men and if possible to render help to any white man who was not killed. A messenger was also sent to Sergeant Slack who had been left in charge of the Fort to come to the troops' assistance. However, we found that the Maxim had been captured by the enemy, and as two troopers who joined us told us that *all* the white men were killed, we determined that we ought to get back to the Fort so as to put it into as strong a position as possible before the enemy attacked it. As we retreated one man, Moma Zaria, picked up another soldier and took him out of action on his horse. They pursued for about an hour and then stopped. On reaching the Fort we found Sergeant Slack had received the message and had gone out two hours earlier with his gun, having immediately informed the Sarikin Muslimin that he must send as much help as he could, and having put all the women inside the Fort. and made them bring in water, whilst he had armed every horseboy and non-combatant with any kind of weapon he could pick up. I at once sent messengers to the Serikins Muslimin, Tambawel, and to the Marafa to come at once to our help. I also despatched three messengers—one a soldier and the others natives, so as to make certain one at least would reach wirehead in safety to the Assistant Resident there with a telegram to His Excellency, notifying him as to what had occurred and saying we were in need of speedy assistance. I also asked the Assistant Resident to send the troops at Jega at once to our assistance, and to send all the help he could. The Sarikin Muslimin was also asked to send food into the Fort for the troops, and to collect all his men. The entrances were blocked up into the Fort, and food for Europeans carried in. A messenger then came in from you with letter addressed to Mr. Hillary, which I opened, and on reading which I wrote the note to you asking you to return. Two or three troopers had returned, one of whom stated the officer commanding had escaped and was collecting troops. Mainasara, the Political Agent, also came in with a broken wrist; Sergeant Slack also returned about 1½ hours after our arrival having heard that all the white men were dead and the soldiers all in full flight. This he heard from the Mijin Dadi, who had been hotly pursued by the enemy. Luckily for us the Mahdi did not pursue to the Fort, so by evening, what with fugitives who had returned and the gunners, and by arming the gun carriers, boys, and other non-combatants, we were in a fairly safe position to ward off attack, especially as the Serikin Muslimin had sent out mounted pickets to scout and keep us informed of what was going on. All the Europeans were on duty all the night, which passed uneventfully, except for the occasional return of fugitive soldiers. Nothing of note occurred except the continual arrival of armed men, including the Marafa who had been called to our assistance, until your arrival at mid-day.

I have, &c.,
MARTIN F. ELLIS,
Sokoto Province.

P.S.—I would like to call your attention to the excellent work performed by Sergeants Slack and Gosling. These non-commissioned officers worked with conspicuous energy, and their example not only tended to restore the confidence of the troops but also impressed the surrounding natives in such a manner as to make them believe that the defence of the Fort would undoubtedly be successful in the event of attack by the enemy.

M. F. ELLIS,
Medical Officer.

LIST OF CASUALTIES sustained in action at Satiru, Sokoto, on 14th February, 1906.

KILLED AND MISSING.

Europeans.	Natives.
Mr. Resident H. R. P. Hillary	24 Soldiers.
Mr. Assistant Resident A. G. M. Scott; Lieutenant F. E. Blackwood, M.I.	1 Horseboy.
WOUNDED.	
Dr. M. F. Ellis, M.O.	Political Agent Mainasara. Two private soldiers.

The majority of the wounds were caused by spear thrusts, and sword and axe cuts, no guns being used by the enemy, and very few bows and arrows.

All casualties occurred within 20 minutes.

M. F. ELLIS,
Medical Officer, Sokoto.

February 21, 1906, Sokoto.

Sergeant C. H. GOSLING, "C" Company, Mounted Infantry, West African Frontier Force, to Major ALDER BURDON, C.M.G., Resident and Commandant, Sokoto.

SIR, Sokoto, February 16, 1906.

I BEG to report that "C" Company, Mounted Infantry, consisting of 69 rank and file, together with one Maxim gun, in charge of a native corporal and three men, left Sokoto at 3.30 a.m. on 14th February, 1906, under command of Lieutenant Blackwood with myself, British non-commissioned officer, Acting Colour-Sergeant, in order to quell a rebellion at Satiru about 14 miles south of Sokoto. We were accompanied by the Resident and the Assistant Resident, Messrs Hillary and Scott, and Dr. Ellis, Medical Officer, Sokoto. Also several native guides accompanied us under orders from Mr. Hillary, Resident. I believe each white man took a horseboy and a servant. Mainasara, Political Agent, and the Mijin Dadi, Sokoto, also accompanied the expedition under orders from the Resident. We marched to within a mile of Satiru in column of groups, after which we formed column of sections, seven native soldiers and myself forming the advance guard. Before forming column of sections, I received orders to fall back on to the main body. Lieutenant Blackwood gave the order to form square about 800 yards north of the town of Satiru. We had no time to get the Maxim gun in position, and, in fact, had hardly formed square when the enemy, who were about two thousand strong, charged. The enemy were hiding in a hollow about 600 yards north of the town, and were invisible to us until they started charging. The enemy were nearly all dismounted men. Our men in their excitement did not hand their horses over properly to the No. 3, and, consequently, the horses started plunging and became unmanageable by the Nos. 3, finally breaking the square. The order was then given to open fire independently. But the shooting of the men was very erratic, some of the men not taking the least trouble to aim but simply firing anywhere. The men then lost all morale and started retiring in disorder. Lieutenant Blackwood shouted, "Rally the men, Gosling," which I tried to do. I stood where I was and shouted to the men to fall in, but without success, as they were evidently panic stricken. The rear face of the square was empty, and under orders from Lieutenant Blackwood I went on the opposite side of the square to where Lieutenant Blackwood was, and tried to round up some of the men, when I came across Dr. Ellis suffering from loss of blood from a spear wound in the arm. He was being helped into the saddle by No. 40, Private Moma Wurikin. By this time the enemy were in amongst us and killing such men of ours who had not seized horses and retired. I saw two white men down and Lieutenant Blackwood leading a horse away. I tried to collect some of the men together and form some sort of order. By this time Dr. Ellis was the only white

man I saw standing. And as by this time all men in the vicinity were struck down or retiring in disorder, I considered the only course to pursue was to retire to a safer distance and try to collect as many men as I could. On my way back I found the Maxim gun in the hands of the enemy. The enemy at this time were charging after us in large numbers so that to return was impossible, two men in one case being on one horse and Dr. Ellis having to be supported on his horse. So I concluded the best course to pursue was to retire on the Fort, and hold it in case of an attack on Sokoto, which we did. The men were scattered in all directions, and in spite of continual efforts on my part to collect them they remained scattered. So I collected what men I could and retired on Sokoto Fort. On our arrival at the Fort we found Sergeant Slack had gone out with his section of artillery. The soldiers returned in ones and twos, and about an hour after my arrival Sergeant Slack returned with about 20 soldiers which he had collected. With the six men I had collected and the guard which had been left on the Fort, Dr. Ellis and I at once made preparations for the safety of the Fort.

C. H. GOSLING,
Sergeant.

Casualties at present date, 16th February, 1906, are:—

Killed and missing...	23
Reported prisoners	2
Wounded	2

Number of horses killed and missing 10 (reduced to 4 by February 23rd).

P.S.—Sir,—I wish to bring before your notice No. 40, Private Moma Wuriki, who caught a horse and helped Dr. Ellis into the saddle, and who also caught a horse for Mr. Scott before he (Mr. Scott) was cut down. I also wish to state that Private Arzika Sokoto, and No. 2215, Private Moma Zaria never left the Doctor and I in our pursuit of the Maxim gun, and No. 2215, Private Moma Zaria, showed great coolness and gallantry in going back towards the advancing enemy and placing a dismounted soldier in front of his saddle and carrying him out of danger.

C. H. GOSLING,
Sergeant.

Sergeant J. SLACK, Royal Field Artillery, to Major ALDER BURDON, C.M.G., Resident and Commandant, Sokoto.

SIR, Sokoto, February 16, 1906.

I BEG to report that about 3 a.m. on Wednesday, the 14th February, 1906, Lieutenant Blackwood, the Officer Commanding Sokoto, ordered me to take charge of the Fort and all troops left behind, which consisted of the Right Section 2/A.N.N. (11 non-commissioned officers and gunners and 15 carriers), and 12 non-commissioned officers and privates of "C" Company, Mounted Infantry, who were on guard; he also ordered me to keep my gun in readiness to follow on if it was necessary.

2. About 3.30 a.m. Lieutenant Blackwood, with Sergeant Gosling and about 70 rank and file of "C" Company, Mounted Infantry, accompanied by Resident Hillary, Assistant Resident Scott, and Dr. Ellis, West Africa Medical Staff, Bombardier Kadri Illorin, 2/A.N.N.R., as medical officer's orderly, left for "Satiru" to suppress natives. About 8.25 a.m. a private of "C" Company came galloping up to me and said the gun was required at once, and reported that Lieutenant Blackwood, Resident Hillary, and Assistant Resident Scott were killed, and Dr. Ellis severely wounded, and that he had no idea what had become of the Colour-Sergeant. I immediately left with my section and took five men of "C" boys stable guard to scout for me. I had been travelling about an hour when I met Sergeant Musa Takai and three men of "C" Company returning to Sokoto. I questioned them as to what had taken place, but their replies contained no reliable information, and they appeared to be panic stricken. I ordered them to join my advanced guard and continued my march.

3. About 10.30 a.m. I met the "Mijin Dadi" and a Political Agent named Mainasara returning from "Satiru"; they informed me that some white men had been killed, that the soldiers had run away and left the white men. About 200 yards distant I saw some soldiers dismounting near a tree, and I sent for them; there were six privates of "C" Company and Sergeant-Major Adamu Yola. I enquired from the Sergeant-Major where the remainder of the soldiers were, and he told me that they ran away in all directions when the fight commenced, and not more than 20 men remained with the white men. He said he had collected all he could and was waiting for me.

4. A native then came galloping up on the Maxim gun horse, and told me that the gun had been captured and all the white men were killed, and that the enemy were marching on to Sokoto. I decided to return at once to the fort and hold it at all costs, and I also asked the Mijin Dadi if he would kindly send to the "Sultan of Sokoto" at once, and asking him to let me have as many mounted spearmen as he could. Mijin Dadi sent in at once; it was then about 11 a.m.

5. As I was returning, men came in from all directions, and one man informed me that "Dr. Ellis (wounded) and Sergeant Gosling" had returned to the Fort and had sent him to call me back. I got back about 1 p.m., and found Dr. Ellis (although suffering severely) engaged with Sergeant Gosling making preparations to hold the place. In the absence of any military officer I took charge of the Fort, and all troops, which amounted to 40, all ranks. About 2 p.m. the "Mijin Dadi" came up and reported that the "Sultan" had sent me the horsemen as requested, all under the command of the "Sarikin Zanfara"; they numbered about 250, and I believe there were about the same number of archers dismounted. The Sarikin Zanfara said the Sultan had given him orders to carry out any duties the white man required. I at once posted about 150 of the horseman about 1,500 yards distant from the Fort, the remainder I kept here. I sent my thanks to the Sultan through the Mijin Dadi.

6. About 7 a.m. on the 15th the Marafa, with about 500 horsemen and between 200 and 300 dismounted archers, arrived here, and said the Sultan had sent him with instructions to carry out any duties the white man required. He said he had received information that Mr. Hillary was a prisoner, and he requested to be allowed to proceed at once, and, if possible, rescue him and break the town. I informed him that Major Burdon was expected to arrive shortly, and I would much rather he awaited his arrival; he then said "very well, may I go out and escort Major Burdon into Sokoto?" I at once said "yes," and thanked him.

7. Every precaution was taken for the safety of the place, and no events of importance took place up to the arrival of Major Burdon, C.M.G., about mid-day on Thursday the 15th instant, when on his arrival he took command.

I am, &c.,
JAMES SLACK, Sergeant,
Royal Field Artillery,
No. 2 Battery, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

Brigade Office, Northern Nigeria Regiment,
West African Frontier Force, March 7, 1906.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I HAVE the honour to submit to you the names of two privates of the Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment, who behaved with the greatest gallantry in the fighting near Sokoto on the 14th and 17th of February last. I quote, verbatim, the report of Dr. Ellis, West Africa Medical Staff, one of the two surviving white men who were present at the engagement of the 14th:—

> "I caught a horse and was going to mount when some men ran at me; one killed my horse with a spear and a second man I shot with my revolver, a third stuck a spear in my right shoulder. No. 40, Private Moma Wuriki came up and shot the man who had speared me, caught a horse and lifted me up into the saddle. The same trooper then rushed across to Mr. Scott, who

had got free from the enemy but could not catch his horse. Moma Wuriki caught a horse and gave to him. Scott tried to mount but a man thrust at him and knocked him down. Moma Wuriki undoubtedly saved my life and tried his best to save Mr. Scott's, shooting at the enemy as he went to and fro."

Major Alder Burdon, C.M.G., Resident, Sokoto Province, says that No. 40, Private Moma Wuriki saved Dr. Ellis's life and tried to save Mr. Scott's, and that No. 2215, Private Moma Zaria showed great gallantry in returning towards the advancing enemy and taking a dismounted comrade on his saddle. Major Burdon also says that these same two privates, No. 40, Private Moma Wuriki, and No. 2215, Private Moma Zaria behaved with great gallantry in the action of the 17th, when they saved the Marafa of Godabawa, a loyal chief, by their coolness.

Sergeant Gosling, 7th Royal Fusiliers, the other white survivor of the 14th, also corroborates Dr. Ellis's statements as to the gallantry of Privates Moma Wuriki and Moma Zaria in the action of the 14th. I would ask Your Excellency to recommend that these men may be granted the Distinguished Conduct Medal:—

No. 40, Private Moma Wuriki, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

No. 2215, Private Moma Zaria, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

I have, &c.,
J. HASLER, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Acting Commandant.

No. 19.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received April 14, 1906.)

[*Answered by No.* 24.]

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
Zungeru, March 14, 1906.

MY LORD.

IN continuation of my despatch of 7th March, and in confirmation of my telegram, No. 32, of 12th March,* I have the honour to report further regarding the disturbance at Sokoto.

2. Major Goodwin arrived at Sokoto on 1st March—a wonderful feat in marching—with 150 rifles; Major Green, from Kano, with 280 mounted infantry, arrived on 4th; and Captain Cockburn, with 114 more infantry, arrived on the 8th—making a total, as I reported in my despatch of 28th February,† of 573 rifles, including the Sokoto details. Meanwhile, the rebels were being watched by the native chiefs and horsemen of Sokoto. They became very aggressive, burning several loyal towns, and terrifying the whole densely populated district, who could not face them.

3. Early on 10th March Major Goodwin attacked. The enemy twice charged the infantry, and once the mounted infantry; but, being an almost unarmed rabble, they suffered serious loss from the rifles and Maxim fire. The force then advanced and found the village held in force, and it was taken at the point of the bayonet—the enemy persistently awaiting every charge. Driven from the place, they were pursued by the mounted infantry, who found a body of them collected in thick bush and attacked and routed them. The native horsemen continued the pursuit in every direction. The numbers opposed to our forces are estimated at about 2,000. The women had mostly left Satiru, but those found by us or caught by native parties are being handed over to the Sultan of Sokoto for subsequent disposal; all are being declared freed. In the attack Captain Gallagher was wounded in the arm by a poisoned

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* Nos. 18 and 18.

† No. 17.

arrow, he is doing well; and in the mounted infantry pursuit Captain Macdonnell and Sergeant Tompkins were slightly wounded. Among the native ranks six were wounded seriously and four slightly. The bodies of Messrs. Hillary, Scott, and Blackwood were recovered on the scene of the disaster, and were buried with military honours; all three of them were obviously killed in action. Dan Makafo, the leader, was wounded and subsequently captured by a loyal chief, whose town he had previously burnt. He will be tried by the Sokoto Native Court for the murder of the Tsomo villagers, which was the original cause of our intervention. I think it preferable to allow this course than to try him in the Provincial Court, so as to show the people how fully the native chiefs are identified with us. In this action no native levies were allowed to take any part, it being left to our own troops to re-establish their credit after the former reverse; but the native horsemen joined in the pursuit, and, indeed, it would have been practically impossible to prevent their doing so.

4. Major Burdon reports, in a telegram just received, that on March 12th a great Durbar was held with the Serikin Muslimin and all the chiefs engaged on our side, at which my message of thanks for their loyalty and the confidence I had had throughout that they would prove loyal was read to the Sultan "before a vast assembly and received with the liveliest satisfaction." "All Sokoto," he continues, "went out yesterday to inspect the battlefield and to raze Satiru to the ground. No wall or tree left standing. The Serikin Muslimin has pronounced a curse on anyone building or farming on the site.

5. Major Burdon says that he heard news on the 7th that another self-styled Mahdi had arisen east of Raha, as a rival to Dan Makafo. The Emir of Sokoto has sent to summon him. No serious outcome of this new development is anticipated, but the troops will remain till it is settled.

6. It has been with the greatest possible pleasure and gratification that I have informed your Lordship of the loyalty shown by all the chiefs throughout the Protectorate, with the exception of Gando. In illustration of this I venture to enclose an extract from a letter received to-day from Captain Orr, Resident of Zaria. I enclose also a letter from Major Burdon, correcting various statements in his long report, which formed an enclosure to my last despatch.* In the case of Gando the disaffection is limited to the chief and his immediate entourage, as your Lordship will see from the enclosed letter from Captain Ruxton, Resident of Gando.

7. All appears to be quiet for the moment at Hadeija; but the news from the Resident of Bauchi (the Hon. O. Howard) remains unsatisfactory. I hear to-day from him by telegram that a messenger, sent by the Emir to ascertain news, reports that there is a very large following of the Senussi on Lake Chad, which is growing greater; and that they have selected Bima (on the borders of the Bornu and Bauchi provinces) as the place of assembly. This is the same place (near Burmi where the former fanatical outbreak occurred in 1903) which was announced by the two precursors whom Mr. Howard succeeded in arresting. I had sent up a picked company direct from Munshiland. They have arrived, and with the Bauchi Company will build a fort at Bima, and occupy the place. Mr. Howard considers this force sufficient for any contingency, but I hope to reinforce it shortly in case of eventualities. Meanwhile, the native reports about the Senussi gathering are very vague. If true, it has, of course, taken place in French territory, and there is no indication by what route it is intended to invade Northern Nigeria. The unrest in this direction is due to the recent occupation of Wadai by the French, and the continual fighting which has been going on for a long time between them and the Moslem religionists east of Chad. Mr. Howard's messenger stated that he had seen Mallam Senussi and Naiobe, Rabeh's son, who stated that they had come from Wadai with a large following.

8. I have asked your instructions by cablegram as to whether the Lagos troops should now return to Lagos, since I have no funds to meet the expenses of their remaining here.

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* No. 18.

9. I have now got back all my own troops from Munshiland. The campaign there was completely successful, though the column had not time to penetrate more than 30 miles into the country, and was precluded, by your instructions, from marching through the country. Little resistance was offered and but few casualties occurred. Colonel Hasler was of opinion that a small force might traverse the country from end to end. Fifty captives were released, but the hurried recall of the troops prevented any measures of permanent settlement being taken. I shall later submit to your Lordship a detailed account of these matters with a "despatch relating to field operations." In the meantime I desire to bring to your notice the extraordinarily fine performance of the troops and carriers in their forced marches to Zungeru. Colonel Hasler only received my telegram recalling the troops on 22nd February. He reached Abinsi on 23rd February, and, by travelling with the utmost speed—riding the last 83 miles in 27 hours—he reached Zungeru on 2nd March. Captain Cock, with a column of 280 troops and 300 carriers, marched overland some 312 miles in 12½ days, over bad roads and through a part of the country affording insufficient supplies. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell, coming by river to Katcha, with a half company marched the last 83 miles in 48 hours. The Lagos troops also lost no time in putting their orders into execution. They received them late one evening and started next morning. I have taken the opportunity of expressing my appreciation of their efforts on a parade at which both the Northern Nigeria Regiment and the Lagos troops were present.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

EXTRACT from a Letter, dated 4th March, from the Resident, Captain C. W. Orr, Zaria Province.

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2. The Serikin Birni-n-Gwari met and escorted me through his territory, showing his usual loyalty throughout, and sending messengers to the Sokoto border to obtain information.

3. On arriving in Zaria territory I was met by mounted messengers from the Emir, sent especially to convey to me a welcome from the Emir and ascertain the exact date of my arrival in Zaria. The villages through which I passed treated me with, if anything, more than usual hospitality and cordiality.

4. Five miles from the Residency I was met by the Emir and all his headmen and a very large following. They gave me the most cordial reception I have received since I first came to the province, escorting me for two miles towards the Residency, and were evidently bent on showing their loyalty in as marked a way as possible. I was glad to be able to deliver personally to the Emir His Excellency's letter and message of greeting, which seemed to please him very much.

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7. The following day I rode into the town, and had an informal interview with the Emir, and discussed with him the whole situation. His attitude throughout has been most satisfactory, since from the very first he has taken every opportunity of showing his loyalty, without hesitating a moment to see how affairs were likely to turn out. The day after the first news was received he sent up, entirely of his own accord, 30 men to help building the defences, and he has been most solicitous for the safety and comfort of the missionaries in the town. There has never been the slightest sign of wavering or unrest among the people, and even the hostile ex-Emir's faction sent the head of their family to welcome me back the day after I arrived. Mr. Temple, who came up to Zaria by another road through quite a different part of the province, reports that he was received everywhere by the natives with the utmost cordiality, and that one and all came forward to render

him every assistance in their power. Mr. Arnett reports the same experience on his way up from Katchia with the half company of the West African Frontier Force.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

EXTRACT from a Letter, dated 5th March, from Major Alder Burdon, Resident, Sokoto Province.

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2. In paragraph 11 I state my belief "that the synchronising of the date of the rising with my leaving was coincidence, not intention." I now find that this was not so. The rising was originally planned to take place at the Salla (Id el Kebir) on February 5th, and was postponed till after I should have left.

3. With reference to my description of and remarks on the square formation in paragraphs 20 and 21, I learn from Major Green, D.S.O., commanding the Mounted Infantry, that the formation adopted was that in use in this country. And I therefore request permission to withdraw both these paragraphs so far as they give the impression of criticism on my part, and especially the last sentence of paragraph 21.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 19.

EXTRACT from a Letter, dated 1st March, from Captain F. H. Ruxton, Resident, Gando, Sokoto Province.

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"With this one exception of the Emir, Gando, and in spite of him, all the district headmen, including the Sarikin Fada of Jega, have worked loyally according to their lights and, in some cases, even zealously. The country is absolutely peaceful and the people, at any rate the great mass of the poorer people, are contented.

"Though less touch has been kept with the absolutely independent Emirate of Argungu, the same conditions apply. The Emir is loyal to Government as he always has been; his people express gratitude for the peace that now reigns and orders are at once carried out."

2. On the deposition of the present Emir, provided a small force is present, I should apprehend no disturbance whatever. His successor, Hatiru of Kalgo, has always shown his loyalty to Government, is a "strong" man, with the largest following in Gando, and will be able to maintain his new position.

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No. 20.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received April 19, 1906.)

[*Answered by No.* 24.]

Government House, Northern Nigeria,

MY LORD, Zungeru, March 21, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatch by last mail (March 14th),* I have the honour to report to you on the further developments in regard to the disturbances around Sokoto and elsewhere.

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* No. 19.

2. The Maxim and 14 out of the 25 rifles lost have been recovered, but all are unserviceable. The rebel leader, Dan Makafo, was tried by the Sokoto Native Court for the murder of two French officers and 14 Tsomo villagers, and condemned to death and executed in the Sokoto market-place. He stated that the Emir of Gando had promised him assistance so soon as he should have gained a success. This corroborates all previous news regarding Gando's hostility, and a force has now marched to his capital to arrest him. I have not yet received news of the result. Expressions of loyalty from all Emirs continue to be manifested. The two, who in ancient times were vassals of Gando, were Nupe and Illorin. The former, as I reported in a previous despatch, telegraphed to me offering to send armed men to assist us. The latter asked the Resident to telegraph his congratulations on our success, adding, "Had I and my chiefs been at Sokoto we would have fought for the Governor." It naturally gives me very great satisfaction to find that the Fulani chiefs are actuated by such loyal and friendly feelings at such a time.

On March 16th Major Burdon telegraphed that Dr. Ellis had recovered and Captain Gallagher was progressing favourably.

3. The second incipient Mahdi, who had taken up a position between Sokoto and Kano, had been unable to collect any following, and it is stated that he did not declare himself to be a Mahdi. The Sultan of Sokoto sent a party of horsemen to order him to Sokoto or arrest him. He chose to come in, and that matter is now also finally settled.

4. Action as regards Hadeija is deferred pending the return of the troops from Sokoto to Kano and the arrival of Colonel Lowry-Cole, who is due at Lokoja the day after to-morrow. The Lagos troops left Zungeru yesterday on their return to Lagos.

5. Mr. Howard reports that 50 of the Rabeh's horsemen arrived at Bima on 20th instant to see what was going on and left again. There appears no doubt that the French successes at Wadai have caused a great deal of unrest east of Chad, and that some particular significance attaches to the "Holy Hill of Bima." Bima is only 6 miles from Burmi, and it was to this hill, I believe, that all fugitives ran when defeated at Burmi in 1903. I am placing a strong garrison at the place. Major McClintock, Resident of Bornu, appears to discount these reports, and there is no doubt of the complete loyalty of the Shehu of Bornu.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

No. 21.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received May 12, 1906.)

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
Zungeru, April 11, 1906.

MY LORD,

IN continuation of my despatch of March 21st,* I have the honour to inform you that, as it appeared that the Emir of Gando had promised assistance to the rebels at Satiru if they should again achieve a success, I have considered it advisable to depose him and to put Haliru of Kalgo in his place. This man is very loyal to the Government and is a strong character. He is, of course, one of the legal successors in the Emirate. The Emir, who expected this step, gave himself up outside his city without any trouble.

2. Major Burdon informed me by telegram that the Sokoto Native Court had executed five more of the leading rebels who had been captured, and he had approved the action. I at once forbade any further death sentences.

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* No 20.

3. Colonel Lowry-Cole should reach Hadeija with his force about 22nd instant.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

No. 22.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received May 16, 1906.)

MY LORD, Government House, Zungeru, April 19, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 9th ultimo.* I am not aware of any recent circumstances which may have tended to increase the hostility of the Munshis, or to provoke suspicion in the minds of the tribe, or of any other causes that may have precipitated the outbreak reported in my despatch of the 17th January last. †

2. As I have reported to Your Lordship, the fighting arose out of a very petty dispute between a Hausa man and a Jukum woman. The reports I have received from the Officer Commanding the Expedition go to show that the people were by no means so intractable as they have been considered. In my opinion the idea of looting the Niger Company's stores did not prompt the outbreak, and was only done when the fighting was over, and after some discussion had taken place amongst the Munshis.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

No. 23.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received June 1, 1906.)

Government House, Zungeru, April 28, 1906.

Despatch relating to Field Operations.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to forward the Acting Commandant's report on the operations in the Munshi country, of which he was himself in charge.

A quarrel between the Hausa and Nupe trading population of Abinsi and the local Pagan tribe of the Jukoms led to fighting, whereupon the latter called in the Munshis to their assistance. The traders were annihilated, probably about 80 were killed and 180 carried off as slaves. Though the quarrel was entirely one between natives, the traders rallied round the store and factory of the Niger Company, and the Munshis (I understand after some deliberation, and not until next day) pillaged the store, and razed it to the ground. Abinsi is on the bank of the Benue, and at the moment of this *fracas* the Assistant Resident of the Muri Province was on his way down to arrange the quarrels, which had recently occurred here between the traders and the local tribes. Two telegraph inspectors arrived in a steam canoe simultaneously with the outbreak of fighting, and assisted the traders to defend themselves until overpowered. The refugees crowded a barge containing very valuable telegraph and cable material, and sank her by their numbers.

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* No. 11. † No. 7.

2. I at once despatched a force of 100 men to ensure the safety of the navigation of the Benue, which is used by the Germans as well as ourselves, and I concentrated a strong force at Lokoja for the recovery of the captives and the property looted, and the punishment of the tribes concerned. The force left Lokoja on January 21st, and the arrangements made for its despatch by canoes (this being the low-water season) were carried out by the Marine Superintendent, Mr. Elliot, with exceptional celerity and efficiency.

3. When joined by the advance party at Abinsi, the force consisted of 30 officers, 15 British non-commissioned officers (including medical), 633 rank and file, with 2 guns and 4 Maxims and 950 carriers, and was divided into two columns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler and Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell, respectively. The operations were restricted, in accordance with your orders, to punishing those Munshis who were immediately concerned in the outrage, and recovering stolen property and captives; a Political Officer accompanied each column.

4. The enemy only offered a very desultory and half-hearted resistance, due probably to the size of the force, by which bloodshed was avoided. 38 captives were released and about 50 of the enemy were killed, our only casualties being one officer and one soldier slightly wounded. The towns concerned in the attack upon Abinsi were destroyed. Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler describes the moral effect as having been so great that he is confident a single company could with safety traverse the hitherto dreaded Munshi country from end to end, and in this view the Resident concurs.

5. I was compelled to recall the force in consequence of the disturbances at Sokoto, which at that time gave cause for very grave anxiety. No. 1 column marched 312 miles in 12½ days; while the only half company of No. 2 column, which was ordered to Zungeru, returned by water, and covered the land march from the Niger to headquarters (83 miles) in less than 48 hours. This was at the hottest time of the year; and, in the former case, over one of the most difficult and precipitous pieces of country in the Protectorate.

6. The recall of the force prevented Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler from dealing with the Munshis on the north bank of the Benue, who had joined in the attack on Abinsi; and, as they were known to have a large number of captives, and now assumed a truculent attitude, the officer left in charge of the detachment at Abinsi marched upon the village of a chief who was known to have a number of captives and plunder, and who, according to the statement of a captive who had escaped, had murdered one of them in cold blood, and was preparing poison for his arrows in order to fight. A messenger sent to call upon him to release his captives was told that, if he returned again his ears would be cut off, and he would be made to eat them. He, somewhat naturally, declined to take a further message, and 50 soldiers advanced under Lieutenant Woods towards the village, and were at once fired upon. The bush was dense, and it was not possible to see what result the heavy firing had, but it seems probable that about a dozen Munshis were killed. The juju in the village was covered with blood, and a human arm was found in a hut. The village was destroyed, and subsequently the captives were given up, after discussion (they said) by the Munshis as to whether or not they should kill them all. In all 72 more captives were released, making a total of 118 out of 163, which was the number missing as far as is known, in addition to the 76 actually seen to be killed. The result reflects credit on Lieutenant Woods.

7. Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler has brought forward the names of a number of officers and non-commissioned officers and soldiers whom he considers deserving of special mention for their work. I would myself desire to bring to your special notice the admirable way in which the expedition was organised and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler himself. His dispositions were such that the force was placed in the field in the very minimum of time, and its object effected with little bloodshed and practically no casualties among our own forces. The campaign was too brief to give opportunity to many other officers to distinguish themselves in any very special way, but Captain Short, who commanded the advance guard, has in many minor skirmishes in past years always sustained a reputation for good leadership and reliability, and is, I think, especially worthy of consideration. The other

officers named by Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler have added to reputations for high military qualities, which they have long possessed.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 23.

SIR, Zungeru, March 10, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to forward my report on the operations in the Munshi country in February last.

(1) On January the 2nd a telegram was received from Mr. Watts, of the Niger Company, saying that the Munshis had risen, had attacked, and taken the town of Abinsi, and looted and burned the Niger Company's store at this place.

Acting under your instructions I telegraphed orders to Lokoja that an advanced force should be sent up the River Benue at once, consisting of 2 British officers, 2 British non-commissioned officers, 100 infantry, and a Maxim gun under Captain P. Short, 2nd Northern Nigeria Regiment.

The orders for this force were to ensure the safety of the navigation of the River Benue, to re-occupy Abinsi, and to patrol the river as far as Ibi if necessary.

This force left Lokoja on the 4th of January and arrived at Abinsi on the 9th of January.

Lieutenant I. G. Sewell took one section of infantry and patrolled the river as far as Ibi.

Captain Short found Abinsi deserted; he buried some 20 bodies, and saw many others drifting down the river between Abinsi and Loko.

(2) On the 3rd of January orders were issued to concentrate a force at Lokoja consisting of 2 companies of the 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, each 150 strong, 1 company of the 2nd Northern Nigeria Regiment, 150 strong, and 50 men to make the advanced force up to 150, two 2·95 quick-firing guns.

This force left Lokoja on the 21st January with 564 carriers, and proceeded up the River Benue in canoes arriving at Abinsi on January the 29th.

(3) The composition of the force at Abinsi was 28 officers, 13 British non-commissioned officers, 2 medical officers, 2 medical non-commissioned officers, 598 infantry with 4 Maxims, 35 rank and file artillery with two 2·95 quick-firing guns, 68 permanent gun carriers, and 882 hired carriers.

The force was divided into two columns: No. 1 column under myself, with Major P. M. Robinson as staff officer; No. 2 column under Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Dobell, D.S.O., with Captain J. Mackenzie, V.C., as staff officer.

(4) Arrangements had been made for the column to start at daybreak on February the 1st, but on the night of the 31st January a wire was received saying that by order of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, pending further orders the force was to confine itself to the safeguarding of the navigation of the River Benue.

Accordingly, the force remained at Abinsi, and confined itself to protecting the navigation of the River Benue, and procuring food (viz., yams and guinea corn) for the force, from the Munshi towns near Abinsi, all of which had been implicated in the attack upon that town.

During this time 11 tons of yams, and 20 tons of guinea corn were brought into Abinsi, and a small quantity of the goods looted from the Niger Company store were recovered, the chief item being 146 bags of salt.

(5) On February 9th I received a wire from you that the Secretary of State for the Colonies considered it most desirable that operations should be restricted

to the object immediately in view, and that I was to punish those Munshis who attacked Abinsi, and any who combined with them, and to endeavour to arrest ringleaders, and recover stolen property and captives. When this was accomplished, the expedition was to return, surveying as much country as possible. Also, if the Munshis on both banks of the river were hostile and likely to interfere with the navigation, both banks were to be traversed at short distance from them.

(6) On the night of February the 10th-11th the 4 infantry companies went out to attempt to surprise small towns within a radius of 6 miles from Abinsi.

Most of these towns were found deserted, but as looted property was found in them they were all destroyed.

One Company met with slight opposition, and two of the enemy were killed.

On February the 13th the 2 columns moved out, No. 1 column proceeding S.E., and No. 2 column proceeding S.W. towards the Massava country.

No. 1 column surprised the town of Marqua at midday and fighting took place; 18 of the enemy were killed.

Our only casuality was one man wounded.

(7) From the 13th to the 23rd the column marched through the country occupied by the Yungwa, Mongobo, Gwando, and Kwaraba tribes. Little resistance was offered and only a little desultory fighting took place.

All the towns in which any proof of complicity in the attack on Abinsi (in the shape of looted property or Hausa captives) was found, were destroyed, and their cattle and part of their food supply confiscated.

Thirty-eight Hausa captives were released and a good survey of all the country traversed was made by Captain H. C. L. Cock, R.A.

It was found impossible to capture any ringleaders in the time available, as they were all hidden away in the thick bush.

(8) On February the 23rd, when the column was about 25 miles from Abinsi, a wire was received from you informing me of the severe fighting near Sokoto, and ordering the force to return immediately, leaving a sufficient force at Abinsi to protect the Benue navigation.

The column at once countermarched and reached Abinsi next morning and, crossing the River Benue the same day, started for Zungeru viâ Lafia-Beri-Beri, Keffi, and Abuja.

(9) In the meantime No. 2 column had been traversing the Massava-Kwaraba country. This column also met with only half-hearted resistance.

They covered a large tract of country, burning the guilty towns, releasing captives, and recovering a portion of the stolen property.

About 30 of the enemy were killed by them, their only casualty being Captain C. F. Thornton, who was slightly wounded.

(10) On my arrival at Abinsi I sent out an officer with 20 men to recall the column under Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell, which arrived at Abinsi on February the 26th.

Leaving half a company at Abinsi he proceeded down the Benue in canoes, but, under your instructions, I deflected one of his companies at Loko to proceed viâ Keffi to Bauchi.

(11) The results of the expedition are that:—

(*a*) Practically all the towns concerned in the attack on Abinsi, the murdering of the Hausa men and women, the looting of the store, and the taking away captives into slavery, were heavily punished. Their towns have been destroyed, a large portion of their food supply confiscated and burnt, and about 50 of their men killed.

A few towns on the north bank of the River Benue which were implicated in the looting subsequent to the attack, and who are

reported to have some captives in their possession, were not dealt with owing to the expedition being suddenly recalled.

(*b*) Fifty of the captured Hausas were released.

(*c*) A certain amount of the stolen property was recovered.

(*d*) A good survey of all the country traversed was made. This was not, of course, as complete a survey of the Munshi country and the River Benue as would have been possible had the force not been suddenly recalled.

(*e*) I feel confident that the moral effect of the expedition on the Munshis has been so great that the country could be administered by a Resident if a garrison of one Company were posted at, say, Katsena Allah.

(12) I would call your attention to the fine marching performance of the troops on their being recalled.

On receiving your urgent wire with the news of the rising at Sokoto, it appeared quite possible that there would be a general religious rising throughout the Protectorate. I therefore called upon the officers and men for a special effort.

No. 1 column, consisting of two companies of infantry and one 2·95 quick-firing gun, marched 312 miles, the last 180 miles of which were over a very bad and rocky road, in 12½ days.

The half company of No. 2 column, the remainder being en route to Nafada, and at Abinsi, covered the 83 miles, from Kachia viâ Bida to Bari Jako, in less than 48 hours.

(13) The force was assisted in every way by Mr. W. F. Gowers, Resident, Muri Province, who was indefatigable in procuring guides and intelligence.

Mr. Norton-Smith, Assistant Resident, Muri Province, also did good work with No. 2 column.

The arrangements made by Lieutenant C. Elliott, R.N.R., the Marine Superintendent at Lokoja, for the embarkation of the force were excellent. His staff were very hard-worked in collecting canoes, &c., and are deserving of the highest praise.

(14) The medical arrangements were very good and complete. An outbreak of small-pox among the carriers looked serious at one time, but all suspicious cases were isolated and the epidemic checked.

(15) The marching and shooting of the troops was very good and their discipline excellent.

(16) I submit to your notice the names of the following officers, non-commissioned officers, and men whom I consider deserving of special mention for their work:—

Brevet-Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) C. M. Dobell, D.S.O., Royal Welsh Fusiliers. This officer commanded a column with great skill and judgment. He is an officer eminently suited as a leader. All his dispositions were excellent.

Captain (temporary Major) P. M. Robinson, Royal West Kent Regiment. Major Robinson was Chief Staff Officer to the force, and Staff Officer to No. 1 column when the force was separated. His arrangements were perfect. This officer has all the qualities of a good Staff Officer in the field. He was highly mentioned for his good work in this capacity on the Burmi Expedition in 1903.

Captain P. H. Short, Gloucestershire Regiment. This officer did good work and showed discretion when in command of the advanced force. He has already been mentioned for good work in this country. His energy and ability are of a high order.

Captain J. Mackenzie, V.C., The Royal Scots. This officer was Staff Officer to No. 2 column, and his work is especially mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell.

Honorary Lieutenant (and Quartermaster) D. Lees. This officer performed, in the most capable manner the arduous task of collecting and organising the carriers

of the force, and rationing them and the soldiers. He has done most valuable service in this country.

Lieutenant W. D. Barber, King's Royal Rifle Corps. This officer's ability and energy mark him for special consideration. His handling of a patrol on the 22nd of February was particularly creditable, he managed to surround and surprise a bush camp, and in the encounter which ensued killed six of the enemy.

Captain H. C. L. Cock, Royal Artillery. This officer performed the duties of Intelligence and Sketching Officer. He was absolutely indefatigable in his efforts and has produced an excellent survey of the country traversed.

Staff-Sergeant L. Woodell, Royal Army Medical Corps. This non-commissioned officer was most energetic and untiring in the performance of his duties. The excellent work performed by him during the Yola campaign of 1901 was very highly commended by Colonel T. L. N. Morland, C.B., D.S.O., in his despatches.

Orderly-Room Sergeant J. O. C. Suffield, Royal West Kent Regiment, performed the duties of Colour-Sergeant to a company, and Sergeant-Major to a column. His work was done in the most efficient and capable manner.

Also the following native ranks:—

No. 2,036, Company Sergeant-Major Okoro Muzum.
No. 2 Company Sergeant-Major Ayodele.
No. 706, Sergeant Awdu N'Gaski.
No. 3,093, Private Awdu Bida.

I have, &c.,
J. HASLER, Lieutenant Colonel,
Acting Commandant,
Northern Nigeria Regiment.

To His Excellency
The High Commissioner,
Northern Nigeria.

No. 24.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

SIR, Downing Street, June 7, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 28th of February, and the 7th, 14th, and 21st of March,* reporting the measures taken by you to deal with the recent disturbances in the Sokoto Province.

2. I have learnt, with great satisfaction, of the promptitude with which you were able to deal with the situation that arose after the engagement at Satiru, and of the rapidity with which the troops were concentrated at Sokoto, and I share your view that great credit is due both to officers and to the men of the forces concerned.

3. I have pleasure also in expressing my recognition of the credit that is so largely due to yourself for the remarkable loyalty shown by the native Emirs, which is to be attributed to the policy which you have consistently pursued towards them and to the loyal and intelligent manner in which your officers have interpreted that policy.

4. Major Burdon, Dr. Ellis, and Sergeants Slack and Gosling, behaved with great gallantry and discretion, and I should be glad if you would cause them to be informed of my appreciation of their conduct.

I have, &c.,
ELGIN.

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* Nos. 17 to 20.

No. 25.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received June 9, 1906.)

MY LORD, Government House, Northern Nigeria, Zungeru, May 9, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatches relating to the disturbances at Sokoto, the unsatisfactory attitude of Hadeija, and the unrest in the east, I have the honour to report to you further on these matters.

2. The Resident at Sokoto reported to me that the originator of the rebellion, Dan Makafo, before his execution by the Native Court of Sokoto, had admitted that the Emir of Gando had promised him assistance if he could achieve another success. There was (I was told) also a rumour current at Sokoto that the Emir of Gando intended to murder the Resident if he said any "hard word" to him, and his general attitude of hostility was beyond doubt. I therefore directed that he should be deposed after the dispersal of the rebels at Satiru. This step had long been in contemplation, and his successor had been selected with the entire concurrence of the Serikin Muslimin (Emir of Sokoto). The choice fell upon Haliru of Kalgo, who was one of the three legal successors—a man of character and influence, who has shown himself most loyal to the British Administration. The force marched to Gando and summoned the Emir to give himself up. Reassured by the liberal treatment I have always accorded to any deposed Emir, he at once did so, and I am most glad that there was consequently no shot fired, and no life lost. He was sent down under escort to Lokoja, where he has been established in comparative comfort; and Haliru of Kalgo was installed as Emir. So far as I can judge, there is now every prospect of peace and development in both Sokoto and Gando.

3. The position at Hadeija I have already described. The Emir himself appeared anxious to avoid hostilities, and had on one or two occasions gone out of his way to show a friendly attitude. He had assisted to build our barracks, and had invited the officers to witness a Mohammedan festival. This was some time ago, and was the outcome of the interview with myself in December, 1904, when he had apparently decided to adopt friendly relations with the Government. I have consistently endeavoured by every means in my power, since the fall of Kano in February, 1903, to avoid resorting to force with Hadeija, and to this end, as I have reported to you in my Annual Report for 1904,* I invited the friendly offices of the Emir of Kano, apparently, with success. After three years of patient effort, however, it was clear that my motives were misconstrued by the "war party" in the city, who—as is the nature of the people—ascribed leniency and patience to fear. Men were overheard in Hadeija discussing the chances of "rushing" the garrison by night and getting between the soldiers and the arms-house, and matters culminated in the murder of a West African Frontier Force soldier.

4. I considered that, if the rumoured Mahdist movement in the direction of Bima (Eastern Bauchi) should develop, I should then have a serious situation to deal with, for Hadeija might, and probably would, have precipitated a conflict when the troops were required to deal with another enemy, and, in any case, I could not have withdrawn the Hadeija garrison, which would have deprived me of 250 troops. A further reason which compelled me to settle the Hadeija matter without delay was that by so doing I should have a mobilised and powerful force under the Commandant within striking distance of Bima, or any other point in the East, at the moment when the disturbance in that direction might be expected to mature—if the rumours were worth anything.

5. Immediately, therefore, on the arrival in Nigeria of Colonel Lowry-Cole, I desired him to proceed to Hadeija, steps having already been taken to concentrate a force in readiness at Kano. The instructions which I gave to the Resident were that he should call upon the Emir to surrender the well-known heads of the war-party, with the alternative that they would be arrested by force. The Emir was to have 24 hours in which to decide on his course of action. I was aware that he was largely in the hands of the pernicious clique of head slaves and eunuchs, which

* See p. 37 of Colonial Reports—(Annual) No. 476.

have been the curse of every Emirate in this country, and who, without exercising any useful administrative functions, have been the greatest source of oppression and tyranny in the past, and to whose evil counsel most of the deposed Emirs owe their fall. These men truly recognise that in a reformed administration they have everything to lose; their removal is a cause of rejoicing to the people at large. I have not yet succeeded in wholly getting rid of them in many of the Emirates, but their power has been broken; this subject, however, is beyond the scope of this despatch.

6. Recognising the difficulty in which the Emir would be placed if he should wish to comply with my demands, and that in all probability he would be unable to do so, I not only directed the Resident to offer him an asylum if he wished to escape from the war-party, whom he could not control, but I told him also to secretly inform the Emir that, since he would unavoidably lose prestige by deserting to us, I was prepared to reinstate him if he escaped to Katagum, and the chief of that place would afford him asylum.

7. Colonel Cole reached Hadeija with his Expeditionary Force on April 23rd. A demand for the surrender of the hostile chiefs, to which the Resident added a demand for the arms and ammunition and the demolition of a part of the wall, was made on the 24th, and was at once refused and the Resident's envoy "treated with contumely." Thereupon Colonel Cole attacked, and "after 5 hours' fighting, cleared the streets of the town of all rebels." I have only just received the telegram informing me of this successful action. It continues as follows:—"All leaders wanted by Resident were either killed or captured, not one escaping; they fought with great courage, charging repeatedly, and, but for their indifferent weapons, we must have suffered a good many casualties. No European casualties; those among native troops not yet ascertained, but they are few. Heat very intense; 113 degrees in shade yesterday. All ranks deserve credit for efforts. Town practically uninjured." The Resident, Captain Phillips, informs me that the Emir himself was killed in the fighting, and that, as it was the universal wish of the people that the Chiroma should be appointed in his place, he has been temporarily installed. He adds that there is no disorder of any kind; the town is little damaged; some grass-houses unavoidably destroyed by shell-fire; town perfectly quiet. People returning quickly.

8. Turning now to the Bima or Mahdist movement in Eastern Bauchi. Reports pointed to a gathering of fanatical Fulani at Mandara in German territory. It was variously stated that the Mahdi would arise at Bima and at Bulda (German), and it was reported that a certain number of Fulani were gathering at the latter place. The Germans were well aware of the movement, and had taken steps regarding it. Meanwhile, several preaching Mallams began to endeavour to excite the people of Bauchi, where there is a strong Fulani element, especially in Eastern Gombe. The prompt and energetic action of the Hon. O. Howard, Resident, and the ability shown in ascertaining early news of their movements, practically checkmated this propaganda before it had time to mature. One Mallam, who was preaching the extermination of all "Kaffirs," including Europeans and Pagans, was arrested and executed by the Native Court of Bauchi; a second was caught and deported. Two others escaped, one to Kuka, whence he went to Wadai, the other (it is said) to Mandara. Mr. Howard then occupied Bima itself with the company stationed close by (Nafada), and built a fort there, and with my concurrence brought the Bauchi Company also to Bima. This combined force of 300 men entrenched was considered by all amply sufficient to deal with any possible incursion from German territory. Meanwhile, patrols along the German frontier were instituted from Maifoni in Bornu, and secret agents were employed. I have to-day a telegram from the Resident, Bornu, dated April 9th, informing me in effect that the movement has "fizzled out." Mr. Howard had reported that spies had visited Bima, and the Resident, Bornu, says, that the alertness of the Administration and the preparations made, together probably with the news of the fate which had overtaken the Satiru rebels, had crushed the movement (if it had ever been intended), and it now appears that the few who had assembled in German territory are intending to proceed to Mecca. I may observe also that Major McClintock, Resident, Bornu, who recently passed through Zungeru on his way home, entirely discredited the rumours I have reported, and he was the man best qualified to judge of any news from the east and south-east beyond our frontiers. Nor was importance apparently attached to

them by Mr. Temple, who has been Resident of Bauchi since we occupied it in February, 1902, or by Dr. Cargill or Mr. Hewby. In addition, however, to the 300 men at Bima, I am sending another company from the Hadeija force. This company is in ordinary course of relief of one of the two there, but will remain long enough to ascertain that the rumoured movement is wholly extinct. Colonel Barlow proceeds at once to inspect these garrisons in Bauchi and Bornu, and will be on the spot to take command should occasion arise. The garrisons combined could put a force of 500 men in the field, which would be capable of annihilating any such movement. The news of this concentration, together with the great moral effect of the fall of Hadeija, will, however, I consider, now render any development of what at one time seemed a serious matter almost inconceivable. At the time of the reverse at Sokoto, however, combined with the attitude of Hadeija, it caused me some anxiety.

9. Finally, as regards the Senussi, I concur with Major McClintock that the vague rumours of Senussi movements in the north-east, and of the advance of a Senussi army on Kanem, cannot at present be taken seriously or to constitute any present danger. The reports which have reached me speak vaguely of a movement southwards from Borku, which is some 600 miles from Bornu, and almost as near to Egyptian as to Nigerian territory. The French have a powerful force operating against Wadai, which is at present in the vicinity of Fikri. It is, I believe, to be reinforced by troops from Zinder, variously stated at 150 and 700. If, therefore, there should be any militant Senussi movement on foot, it will probably be adequately dealt with by the French, and it would probably, in any case, be very long indeed before it reached our frontiers. Finally, there seems no special reason why any such movement should be directed towards Northern Nigeria. The Shehu of Bornu, equally with the Fulani who acknowledge the Serikin Muslimin of Sokoto as their religious head, is opposed to Senussiism—which, moreover, at the moment, has all its energies concentrated on its struggle with the French advance on Wadai.

10. I feel, therefore, that I may reasonably report to your Lordship that the period of tension and uncertainty regarding Moslem unrest, which has lasted since I received the news of the reverse at Satiru on February 15th until to-day, may now be considered closed.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

Since writing the above I have news from Bornu reporting that the French have defeated the Senussi force and entirely dispersed it.

No. 26.

SIR F. LUGARD to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received July 26, 1906.)

Abinger Common, Surrey, July 19, 1906.

Despatch relating to Field Operations.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to submit a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hasler, second in command, Northern Nigeria Regiment, covering one from Major R. H. Goodwin, describing the operations near Sokoto in March last. I have also the honour to submit a report by Colonel Lowry-Cole, D.S.O., Commandant, Northern Nigeria Regiment, upon the operations at Hadeija. I have delayed the former report until I should have received the latter, since the two formed part of what may be considered a single campaign, undertaken largely by the same troops.

2. The causes which led to the operations in March will be within Your Lordship's recollection. A party composed, it would seem, partly of malcontents of the lower orders and partly of a fanatical band of religionists, who lived at a village named Satiru, 14 miles south of Sokoto, under the leadership of Mallam Isa, son of a man who in the previous year had declared himself to be a Mahdi, and of one Dan Makafo, an outlaw from French territory, who boasted that he had killed two French officers, raised the standard of revolt and inaugurated their proceedings by the massacre of ten or twelve persons and the destruction of the neighbouring village of Tsomo, because they would not join them. The outbreak was as much directed against the Emir of Sokoto, head of the Mussalmen, as against the British, and was, in fact, hostile to all instituted authority, and the Emir was completely unaware of the movement.

3. Lieutenant F. E. Blackwood was at the time in command of the Company of Mounted Infantry at Sokoto, and, at the request of the Acting Resident (Mr. H. R. Preston-Hillary, who, with his assistant, Mr. A. G. M. Scott, accompanied him), he moved out on the morning of February 14th, towards the village of Satiru. Mr. Hillary was eager to settle the matter without bloodshed, and confident that he could do so, and it was probably solely owing to this gallant attempt to give effect to the policy of the Administration by avoiding bloodshed by every possible means, that he lost his life. Arrived at Satiru, he and Mr. Scott left the troops and rode towards the village, shouting that they had not come to fight but to discuss the causes which had led to this disturbance. Lieutenant Blackwood, it appears, fearing for the lives of his comrades, which he judged to be in danger, abandoned the military precautions he would otherwise have taken, and advanced his men at the gallop, and then, after forming square, again endeavoured to advance to their support. A mounted infantry square is not a formation which is easily capable of being advanced at the critical moment of a charge, but, if a tactical mistake was made, it was made with a most gallant and heroic intention, and it may be said that Lieutenant Blackwood lost his life in his endeavuor to secure the safety of his comrades. The Satiru rebels took no heed of the invitation to a peaceful discussion, and charged the disorganised square. Lieutenant Blackwood and Messrs. Hillary and Scott fell fighting at the point of impact. Dr. Ellis, Medical Officer, was severely wounded, and was helped out of action by Sergeant Gosling, the only other European present. Twenty-five rank and file out of 69 were killed, and the greater part of the remainder were panic-stricken by the death of their officers, and the *mêlée* caused by their bolting horses, and the overwhelming numbers of the fanatical though ill-armed enemy. Their discipline and courage were, however, vindicated by the gallant action of two men, Privates Moma Wurrikin and Moma Zaria, who, regardless of their own lives, endeavoured to save Mr. Scott (and nearly succeeded in doing so), and finally rescued Dr. Ellis and placed him on a horse, beating off their assailants with great coolness and courage meanwhile. The native sergeant-major, Adamu Yola, also collected all whom he could find, and retired slowly and in good order.

4. Sergeant Slack, R.A., had been left in the fort at Sokoto in charge of his gun detachment. On receiving the news of this disaster he put the defences in order, summoned assistance from the Emir of Sokoto, and advanced towards the scene of the action, meeting Dr. Ellis and the other fugitives. He is reported as having behaved with coolness and discretion in this crisis. The Native Administration responded with the utmost loyalty. Though at first it appeared as if the troops had been exterminated, and only a British sergeant (whom the Sultan had never even seen) was left alive, the horsemen of Sokoto, headed by the Sultan's and the Wazeri's own sons, assembled immediately for the defence of the fort, a message was at once sent to Jegga, some 90 miles distant, where there was a detachment of infantry under a British non-commissioned officer, summoning them to the assistance of Sokoto, and stating that a "new Mahdi had arisen," and that the Mounted Infantry Company had been "annihilated." The telegraph, which I had been pushing forward by concentrated efforts for many months past, had already reached Ambrusa, 25 miles from Jegga, and these messages were at once sent on to wire-head and transmitted to me. They reached me late on the 15th, within 36 hours of the occurrence of the disaster. Meanwhile the Jegga detachment marched at once (3 a.m.), accompanied by Mr. McAllister, Assistant Resident, and were joined *en route* by 150 loyal horsemen from Tambawel. The fact that these various messages from Sokoto to Jegga, and thence to wire-head were carried with such rapidity, necessitating fresh horses in villages passed through, that the loose horses of the

Mounted Infantry were all caught and brought in (the total loss of horses being only 4), and the way in which the chiefs from Tambawel to Sokoto rallied to our assistance, is significant of the loyalty of the people. The Emir of Gando was alone disaffected. Major Burdon, the Resident, had only left Sokoto en route to Headquarters a day or two prior to these occurrences. Messengers overtook him and he hurried back, and assumed the direction of affairs. The Jegga troops arrived safely, and the Fort was rapidly placed in a thorough state of defence, while chief after chief arrived with his following to assist, and undertook the scouting day and night within a radius of some five miles.

5. Meanwhile the Sokoto chiefs had assembled a following of some 3,000 men, and marched on Satiru. So great, however, had the prestige of this rabble become, owing to their success against our troops, that the Sokoto people dared not face them, and their leader narrowly escaped with his life, being saved by the intrepidity of the same two soldiers whom I have mentioned above, who had been allowed with a few others to accompany the Sokoto army.

6. This is the first reverse experienced by the West African Frontier Force since I raised it in 1898, and it came at a singularly unfortunate moment. The military forces of the Protectorate admit of the mobilization of a striking force of about 500 rank and file. This force, increased to rather over 600, with an exceptionally strong proportion of officers, had been despatched to restore order and release the captives taken by the Munshis in their unprovoked attack upon the trading station of Abinsi, on the Benue, over 300 miles from Zungeru, which is itself 250 from Sokoto. The nature of the disaster and the terms of the early telegrams were such as to cause me very grave anxiety, for, apart from the safety of the other British officers in Sokoto, it was impossible to predict what course the victorious rebels might adopt, and what the effect of such a loss of prestige might be. In order to forestall any spread of the disaffection, and eventual grave emergency, I requested the Governor of Southern Nigeria to lend me what troops he had available, and I recalled the Munshi Expedition, but neither of these could arrive in time to deal with the present crisis. Before describing the steps taken to deal with the situation thus created, I desire to record my sense of the great loss which this Protectorate has experienced by the deaths of Messrs. Hillary and Scott and Lieutenant F. E. Blackwood. The former lost their lives, as I have described in paragraph 3, by an endeavour to avoid bloodshed, while Lieutenant Blackwood died in the gallant attempt to save them. I trust that your Lordship may see fit to bring the action of this brave young officer to the special notice of the Army Council.

7. To relieve Sokoto I at once sent 75 rifles from Zungeru—all that were available—which would be reinforced by 75 more from Kontagora *en route*. The command was entrusted to Major Goodwin, Royal Artillery, in whose ability and level-headedness I had the greatest confidence; I had found his advice and soldierly promptitude of the greatest value. The 75 rifles left Zungeru within 24 hours of the receipt of the news by me from Sokoto, and the whole party of 150 reached Sokoto on March 1st (214 miles in 8½ days) having been treated with the greatest hospitality and friendliness by the villages passed. Another 100 rifles were ordered up from Lokoja, and reached Sokoto on March 8th. Wire-head had at first been abandoned, and for some 10 days after the receipt of the first telegrams I received no further news, but I later heard that the enemy had made no hostile movement against the Fort, and had contented themselves with raiding the neighbouring towns, killing a great number of people and burning the villages. I was able, therefore, to despatch 200 Mounted Infantry from Kano with 11 officers and British non-commissioned officers, who arrived at Sokoto on March 4th.

8. On March 10th, Major Goodwin advanced on Satiru with a force of 21 officers, nine British non-commissioned officers, and 517 rank and file. I submit to your Lordship that the concentration of such a force at so remote a place as Sokoto within 24 days of the disaster, and in spite of the absence of the Munshi Expedition, indicates a very high standard of efficiency, and is a performance of which the Northern Nigeria Regiment may justly be proud. There were, in addition, some 70 armed constabulary in charge of the Fort; their arms were not sufficiently reliable to admit of any portion taking part in the action. The enemy fought with great bravery, repeatedly charging the square, and the village was taken at the point of the bayonet. The Mounted Infantry pursued the fugitives, as did also the native horsemen, who

had accounts to settle with them for the numbers of people they had killed, and the villages they had destroyed.

9. I would bring to your Lordship's notice, and to that of the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council, the admirable service done by Major R. H. Goodwin, Royal Artillery, not only in his skilful handling of his troops in the field, which is apparent from the enclosed despatches, but also in the dispositions made prior to the advance of the reliefs. I formed a very high opinion of this officer, and I predict for him a distinguished career. He brings to my notice the names of two officers, Captains Gallagher and Fendall, and two British non-commissioned officers, Sergeants Slack and Maynard; the proportion (4 out of 30) is not large, and I would strongly recommend them for recognition, and, in especial, Captain Gallagher, who has, on repeated occasions, shown exceptional ability in handling troops, and distinguished personal gallantry. He has been frequently mentioned in despatches, and I believe that his influence with his men is unusual, and they will follow him anywhere. I endorse the recommendations among the native ranks which appear in the despatches, and in especial I desire to commend the conduct of Privates Moma Wurrikin and Moma Zaria, whom I referred to in paragraph 3. The action of Private Moma Wurrikin appears to me worthy of the highest reward. Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler adds the names of two more officers, and of one non-commissioned officer for your consideration, especially that of Captain Macdonell. I trust also that your Lordship may see fit to express, through the High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria, to Major McLeod and the officers and 150 rank and file of the Lagos contingent your appreciation of the strenuous efforts made by them to reach Northern Nigeria with the least possible delay. They started, I believe, within 24 hours of the receipt of the news, and reached Zungeru on or about March 5th, too late, of course, to take part in the operations, but, had the matter taken a more protracted and less fortunate course, their services would have been of great value to us. Their discipline and conduct was exemplary, and I heard no single word of complaint during their stay in Northern Nigeria. I would also remind your Lordship of the really phenomenal marches made by the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler's command, on receipt of the news and orders of recall, from Munshi-land.

Captain Cock, with a column of 280 troops and 300 carriers, marched overland some 312 miles in 12½ days, over bad roads and through a part of the country affording insufficient supplies. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell, coming by river to Katcha, with a half company, marched the last 83 miles in 48 hours.

10. The difficulty and anxiety at the time was very greatly increased by news from Eastern Bauchi that certain fanatical preachers were inciting the people to exterminate "unbelievers," and by the attitude of the Emir of Hadeija—or rather of a war-faction among his chiefs and satellites. The former matter was dealt with in a prompt and effective way by the Hon. O. Howard, Resident of Bauchi, but I judged it unwise to postpone any longer a settlement of the matters at issue with Hadeija. It was, I think, largely due to the boastful and independent attitude of this town that the propaganda to which I have alluded had arisen. Even after the arrest of the preachers in Bauchi, it appeared doubtful whether the band of fanatical leaders, who were said to have assembled in German territory with the view of preaching a Jihad at Bima, in Bauchi, had finally dispersed. For three years I had endeavoured to conciliate Hadeija, and this action was, as usual, interpreted as a sign of fear. Our reverse at Satiru compelled me to reassert the prestige of the Government (on which our rule depends), and I judged that the fall of Hadeija would put a final end to the Bima excitement. Nor could I longer afford to leave this threat on the flank of Kano, necessitating the presence of 250 troops, whom I could not detach for service elsewhere, however great the emergency. Moreover, of late it had been reported that schemes for "rushing" the Fort at night had been discussed in Hadeija. In addition to this a soldier had been murdered, it was said deliberately and in cold blood, by the Emir's orders, but this had not been proved, and investigation or reparation was, in the circumstances and tension, impossible without recourse to arms. I, therefore, instructed the Resident to inform the Emir that this state of things had now lasted long enough, and to call upon him to surrender the principal agitators of the war faction whose names were well known (giving him 24 hours to consider his reply); these I intended to remove to another

province. Meanwhile I told the Resident to inform the Emir, whom I believed to be not ill-disposed, that if he was anxious but unable to comply with my ultimatum, he might run away to Katagum till the trouble was over, after which I would reinstate him.

11. The Commandant, Colonel Lowry-Cole, had meantime returned to Nigeria, the troops had returned from Munshiland, and by April 16th the forces engaged at Sokoto had also returned. On that date a force marched out of Kano. When joined by the garrison of Hadeija it amounted to 24 officers, 10 British non-commissioned officers and 687 rank and file, with two guns, and was accompanied by Captain Phillips, D.S.O., Resident, and Captain Rice, Assistant Resident. They found, on their way that all preparations for fighting had been made at Hadeija. My message was sent to the Emir, who struck the messenger (the greatest insult a Fulani could offer), and contemptuously invited Colonel Cole to come and arrest the persons for himself. A main gate in the almost impregnable walls (which rival or surpass those of Kano) was immediately seized. It was not defended, and Colonel Cole formed up inside the town in the open space which intervened between the outer and an old ruined inner wall. Acting with striking self-constraint, and knowing my desire to avoid bloodshed, he sent a messenger three times to "warn the people that if they laid down their arms and came out they had nothing to fear," and he was about to send a fourth embassy with an officer, though the mounted men were apparently ready for action, when he was charged by a body of mounted spearmen. The majority were swept away by the fire of the troops, but re-formed, and charged again with the same result. Again Colonel Cole hoped to avoid the heavy losses to both sides and destruction of property which would result from street fighting, and he gave them 20 minutes to consider their position, and also sent mounted men to the flanks to warn any people they might see to come out by the flanks and avoid the fire. The streets, however, remained guarded by the enemy, and shots and arrows were fired, so that Colonel Cole determined to enter the town.

"The compounds and streets," he reports, "were stubbornly held, the mounted men charging down on our men repeatedly, while slugs and arrows were fired from the doors and walls in the side streets. After about 1½ hours' fighting," the troops reached the Emir's enclosure. Here the resistance was very stubborn, but the entrance was at length forced, and the defenders killed or captured. "In the meantime large numbers of the poorer inhabitants, having laid down their arms, came pouring out by the flanks and were collected behind the reserve. I estimated these at between 3,000 and 4,000." Steps were immediately taken to prevent looting, and the unarmed inhabitants returned to the city. Colonel Cole reports that the officers and British non-commissioned officers deserve great credit for the control which they kept over their men, in circumstances the most trying which troops can be engaged in, viz., street fighting in a populous and wealthy city. The heat was intense (115° in the shade). The fighting men were chiefly mounted, and armed with swords, spears, bows and arrows, and a few firearms. They fought most bravely. Many wore shirts of chained mail. The Emir and his son were shot when charging boldly at a few yards' distance, but few of the poorer people seem to have been killed.

12. I feel sure that your Lordship will feel no less pleasure and gratification than I do at the humanity with which these operations were conducted, and will appreciate the high state of discipline and control which rendered it possible to make such measures effective. The constant efforts to settle the matter without further bloodshed, even after fighting had begun, the care taken to allow the unarmed population a means of escape, and to restore them at once to their homes when the fighting was over, the successful efforts to prevent looting and destruction of property, resulted in an almost immediate pacification and resumption of their normal avocations by the people. It may seem almost quixotic to pay for all supplies when marching through a hostile district, and to take no supplies from the city which had fought against us, but I am of opinion that such actions teach the people confidence in the Government, and show them that the fighting is directed solely against those who take up arms against the King's troops.

13. I submit, for your Lordship's consideration and that of the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council, the name of Colonel Lowry-Cole, whose dispositions led to so complete and effective a victory, and to whom (assisted by the Resident, Captain Phillips, D.S.O.) is due the credit for the measures of humanity

to which I have called attention. The operations were brilliantly carried out, and the troops were so well handled that remarkably few casualties occurred amongst our men, though the nature of the fighting was such as to lead to the expectation that they would be numerous. Colonel Cole brings forward the names of eight officers, three British non-commissioned officers, and several men as deserving of special mention, and I submit them with confidence to your Lordship's consideration, especially those of Captain Fforde Searight and Major Dobell.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD,
High Commissioner.

The returns of casualties, expenditure of ammunition, &c., with sketches of route from Kano to Hadeija and of Hadeija town, have been detached, but they can be forwarded if desired.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

Brigade Office, Northern Nigeria Regiment,
West African Frontier Force, Zungeru, March 24, 1906.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the despatch of Major Goodwin on the recent operations near Sokoto.

The attack appears to have been very well planned, and carried out with great dash and skill.

The co-operation of the Infantry and Mounted Infantry seems to have been very successful, and the whole conduct of the operations reflects the greatest credit on all concerned.

I recommend that the grant of the Africa General Service Medal be applied for to all the troops employed under Major Goodwin from the 19th February, 1906, to March 11th, both dates inclusive.

I would bring to your notice the services of the following officers and non-commissioned officers and men, all of whom appear worthy of recognition:—

Captain (temporary Major) R. H. Goodwin, Royal Artillery, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment.

This officer commanded the operations with great skill and success. He has proved himself a tactful leader, and has gained the confidence of all serving under him.

Captain (temporary Major) A. D. Green, D.S.O., Worcestershire Regiment, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

This officer is mentioned by Major Goodwin as having handled the Mounted Infantry most skilfully, and co-operated excellently with the Infantry. He further led his Mounted Infantry with great dash in the pursuit.

Captain A. E. Gallagher, 9th Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1st Battalion, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

This officer's services were of the greatest value to Major Goodwin. It was largely owing to his cheerfulness and untiring energy that the troops covered the distances they did on the march to Sokoto. In the action he commanded the front face of the square, and afterwards led the charge into the town, and continued to do so after he was hit in the elbow with an arrow, presumably poisoned. He inspired the greatest confidence in his men, who would follow him anywhere.

Lieutenant P. P. W. Fendall, Border Regiment, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

This officer is highly mentioned by Majors Goodwin and Green for his excellent work in reconnoitring on March 5th and 6th, and also for his scouting and drawing

the enemy on on March 14th. He has shown marked capacity as a Mounted Infantry leader.

Captain D. H. Macdonell, City of London Imperial Yeomanry, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

An officer of exceptional ability. His example and great personal influence went far to re-establish the confidence of his company, which had been roughly handled in the engagement of February 14th. Although wounded early in the day, he continued to lead his men with dash and gallantry.

Sergeant J. Slack, Royal Artillery.

This non-commissioned officer did excellent work with his gun in the action of March 10th. Previous to that he had done most valuable work in Sokoto Fort. He acted as Staff Officer to Major Burdon, Resident, Sokoto Province, who speaks of him in the highest terms.

Sergeant J. H. Maynard, Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Battalion, Northern Nigeria Regiment, who did excellent work on the 10th March.

Sergeant H. Bullock, Royal Army Medical Corps, who worked untiringly in the care of the sick and wounded.

Sergeant T. Browning, 21st Lancers, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment, who did excellent service on March 10th.

No. 1836, Lance-Corporal Dowdu Chicogo, No. 3739, Private Samari, "F" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment.

These men were specially noticed by Major Goodwin for the way they stuck to Captain Gallagher during the bayonet charge, and by their fire and bayonet fighting protected him from the enemy.

No. 195 Company Sergeant-Major Garuba Kukua, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment; No. 1141 Company Sergeant-Major Basheru, Sokoto, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment; No. 1684, Sergeant Oyanshola, "B" Company, 1st Battalion, Northern Nigeria Regiment, all of whom, by their example and influence, performed most excellent service.

I have, &c.,
J. HASLER, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Acting Commandant, Northern Nigeria Regiment,
West African Frontier Force.

His Excellency
The High Commissioner,
Northern Nigeria.

The Brigade Major,
Zungeru,

Sokoto, March 11, 1906.

I HAVE to report as follows:—At about 7.30 p.m. on the 15th February, 1906, at Zungeru, I received news from His Excellency the High Commissioner of the reverse to the Mounted Infantry Company at Sokoto, and the deaths in action of Residents Hillary and Scott, and Lieutenant Blackwood. The following morning I obtained His Excellency's permission to leave Zungeru with 75 rifles, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, and proceed to Sokoto viâ Kontagora, picking up 75 rifles, "B" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, at the latter station. Orders were issued to "F" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, on morning 16th February, and the same evening this detachment was ferried across the Kaduna and encamped on the right bank. I was myself detained by His Excellency until the arrival of Major Cockburn at Zungeru. This officer was wired to at Lokoja on the 16th to come up as fast as possible to Zungeru, bringing 100 rifles with him. This force embarked on the evening of the 16th, left Lokoja the morning of the 17th, and Major Cockburn arrived in Zungeru the evening of the 19th. I rode to Kontagora on the 20th, and found that Captain Gallagher, with the 75 rifles from Zungeru, had arrived the same afternoon. This officer had made all preparations for leaving Kontagora the following morning.

The force, as per margin, marched out of Kontagora on the morning of the 21st February, and arrived at Sokoto on the morning of the 1st March, covering the distance—214 miles—in 8½ days.

5 officers,
2 European non-commissioned officers,
153 rank and file, including 3 buglers.
1 medical officer.
1 medical non-commissioned officer.

At Daragga, I received news from Zungeru leading me to suppose that reinforcements were urgently needed. I therefore left at Daragga all loads that could possibly be spared, Europeans' loads were cut down to 2½ per man, inclusive of rations, and proceeded as fast as possible.

Before arriving at Sokoto I heard from Major Burdon, C.M.G., Resident, Sokoto Province, that he considered the garrison sufficiently strong to resist an attack, and that he contemplated no immediate danger. The rising, he moreover informed me, was confined to the following of a fanatical Mallum, who had rebelled against us and against the Serikin Maslimin. As soon as I entered the Sokoto Province it was quite apparent that there was no rising among the native chiefs, for I found that the Serikin Maslimin had sent down the road for preparations to be made to ration my men, and at all the large towns I passed I was treated with the greatest hospitality.

On my arrival at Sokoto I found that Major Burdon, C.M.G., who had taken over command in the absence of any military officer, had taken every precaution for putting the Fort in a state of defence. All Europeans were living in the Fort; a regular system of outposts had been adopted, and the Fort itself much strengthened. The enemy was still occupying Satiru, about 14 miles due south of Sokoto; had made no attempt to follow up his success of the 14th February, and had contented himself with raiding the villages around, murdering those of the inhabitants who refused to join him, and burning the villages. He was reported to number perhaps up to 5,000, to be badly armed, but very cunning and enterprising. He was said to be making no use of the carbines and Maxim gun captured from the Mounted Infantry.

I now felt every confidence that with my present force I should defeat the enemy with heavy loss, but as it was desirable that so dangerous a body of fanatics should be completely defeated, I decided to wait for the reinforcements which were coming up. Major Green, D.S.O., with Mounted Infantry, strength as per margin, arrived at Sokoto on the 4th March, and Major Cockburn, strength, as per margin, on the morning of the 8th March.

Major Green, D.S.O.,
7 officers, M.I., N.N.R.,
4 European non-commissioned officers.
200 rank and file, M.I., N.N.R.

Major Cockburn,
6 officers,
114 rank and file, 1st and 2nd N.N.R.

In the meantime I had spared no pains to perfect the column in the formations which I proposed adopting. On the 5th I had sent an officer's patrol to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, and this duty was performed by Lieutenant Fendall with great skill and enterprise. Although the harmattan was blowing with exceptional thickness, and the enemy tried to cut him off, he drew a map of Satiru and the surrounding country, which afterwards proved of the greatest assistance to me.

At 2 a.m., on the 10th March, the column marched from Sokoto towards Satiru; before entering the dangerous zone a halt was called until daylight, and the column then proceeded towards Satiru.

The total strength of the force was:—

Major R. H. Goodwin in command, accompanied by
Major A. Burdon, C.M.G., Political Officer,
Major J. B. Cockburn, Staff Officer,
1 Medical Officer, 2 Medical Non-Commissioned Officers,
1 Veterinary Officer, 1 Veterinary Non-Commissioned Officer,
1 European Non-Commissioned Officer, with 2.95″ gun, 11 gunners,

8 Officers, 2 European Non-Commissioned Officers } 1st and 2nd Northern
277 Rifles, 2 Maxims } Nigeria Regiment,

8 Officers, 3 European Non-Commissioned Officers } Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria
229 Rank and File } Regiment.

Total, 21 officers, 9 European non-commissioned officers, 517 native ranks. One section of the Mounted Infantry scouted to the front, the main body consisted of the gun, infantry, and Maxims all in "alert" formation, with the rest of the Mounted Infantry in rear.

On the occasion of the reverse to "C" Company, Mounted Infantry, on the 14th of February, the enemy had attacked the Company on a perfectly open plain, and I asked for nothing better than that he should repeat these tactics now. The duty of the Mounted Infantry was, therefore, an exceedingly delicate one. If the enemy became aware of so large a body of horsemen, he might either retire into his town or attack the mounted men, in either of which cases my object of inducing him to attack the Infantry square in the open would be defeated. Lieutenant Fendall was in charge of the scouting section to the front, and this duty he performed with great skill. After locating the enemy he retired slowly before him without firing a single shot, drawing him on to the square which I had formed in the open close to where the Mounted Infantry Company had been attacked on the 14th February.

The enemy, to my disappointment, did not come on in the dense masses I had hoped for, but in a loose straggling crowd. The first body consisted of about 100 footmen; when the leaders had got to about 150 yards range I opened with Maxim fire and section volleys. The square then advanced towards a second large body of the enemy; these also endeavoured to charge home, headed by a Mallum waving a paper over his head. In order to bring a larger volume of fire to bear, I formed forward both side faces of the square; some of the enemy then tried to outflank us on the left, and by hiding behind ant-hills and bundles of cut grass to shoot arrows into the square. I detached Sergeant Maynard with a few goods shots to make a turning movement. The square then moved towards the east end of the town, which was set on fire in two places by shell fire from the gun, which also fired a few shrapnel at the enemy's personnel.

While the Mounted Infantry then moved round the west end of the town I sent "F" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, supported by "B" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, to clear the southern portion of the town with the bayonet. The charge was led with great gallantry by Captain Gallagher, who was himself badly wounded by an arrow which went into the elbow joint, but continued to lead on his men, who went at the enemy with a dash which I have not seen equalled in this country.

The two companies were now rallied, and the remaining portion of the town cleared, and I attribute the smallness of our casualties to the good handling of their men by the Europeans, and to the good snap shooting done by the men.

As far as the Infantry was concerned the fight was now over, but I sent orders to the Mounted Infantry to pursue a considerable body of the enemy whom I had seen retreating over a ridge to the east.

Any animals found in the town were then removed and the town burned, after which the gun and Infantry marched back to Sokoto. One camel, 46 donkeys, 15 horses, most of them very inferior, were handed over to the Resident. These animals, I understand, had mostly been captured by the Satiru people when raiding.

I do not think that the numbers of the enemy opposed exceeded 1,500 fighting men, but they certainly fought with great vigour and determination.

The Mounted Infantry returned to Sokoto from their pursuit the following morning.

Mallum Dan Makafo, the origin of all the trouble, was brought in by some country people on the 12th March. He had been shot through the leg by the Mounted Infantry at or near Dabeggi, where he, with a few fugitives, had gone to get water, and been discovered and fired upon by the pursuing Mounted Infantry.

The Mounted Infantry were most skilfully handled throughout by Major Green, D.S.O., who had no simple task to perform. He had to manœuvre in such a way as to in no measure interfere with the fire from the Infantry square, and at the same time to be in the right place at the right time to pursue fugitives; my instructions on these points were most skilfully carried out.

Before the Infantry left Satiru, the bodies of the three white men killed on the 14th February were found. They were brought back to Sokoto and buried the following day.

I would specially call the attention of the Commandant to the conduct of the following officers, non-commissioned officers, and men:—

Captain A. E. Gallagher, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment. This officer has been absolutely invaluable to me. It is not too much to say that on the march up from Zungeru, it was by his cheerfulness and untiring energy that the column was able to cover the ground as quickly as it did. In the action he commanded the front face of the square, and afterwards, as already reported, led the charge into the town, and continued to lead the charge after he was badly hit in the elbow joint by an arrow, presumably poisoned. This officer has only been in command of "F" Company for about one month, but so completely has he got the confidence of his men that they would follow him anywhere. His company fought splendidly.

Lieutenant P. W. Fendall, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment. This officer, both on the occasion of his making a reconnaissance of Satiru on the 5th-6th March, and of his scouting and drawing the enemy on to attack us on the 10th March, showed great enterprise, skill, and judgment.

Sergeant Slack, Royal Artillery, Northern Nigeria Regiment. This non-commissioned officer handled his gun exceedingly well on the 10th, and previous to that date did the most excellent work in Sokoto Fort. He acted as Major Burdon's Staff Officer previous to my arrival, and Major Burdon speaks of him in the highest terms.

Sergeant Maynard, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment. A most energetic and reliable non-commissioned officer, who did most excellent work on the march up, and also on the 10th instant. He was always in the right place and ready to do anything.

Among Native Ranks.

No. 1836, Lance-Corporal Dowdu Chicogo;
No. 3739, Private Samari;
No. 3548, Corporal Dania Kano;
No. 1093, Private Jagaba;
No. 3431, Private Ali Sorbo, all of "F" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment.

The two former I noticed particularly in the way they stuck to their officer, Captain Gallagher, during the bayonet charge, and by their fire and bayonet fighting protected him from the enemy. The other names have been given to me by Captain Gallagher.

No. 1684, Sergeant Oyanshola;
No. 3115, Lance-Corporal Mah Kuchi;
No. 2091, Private Musa Argungu;
No. 1636, Corporal Akabi, Illorin, all of "B" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment.

These names were given to me by Lieutenant Mann commanding "B" Company. It will be understood that the view inside the town being very limited, I could only see what was going on immediately around me.

I attach a list of the casualties sustained on the 10th March, and also a list of those sustained on the 14th February, on the occasion of the reverse to "C" Company, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

I also attach reports from Major Green, D.S.O., and heartily endorse the recommendations made by that officer.

R. H. Goodwin, Major,
Officer Commanding Troops, Sokoto.

March 15, 1906.

To Major GOODWIN,

Officer Commanding Troops, Sokoto, Sokoto, March 12, 1906.

I BEG to forward the following report on the part taken by the Mounted Infantry under my command at the action at Satiru on March 10th, 1906.

On 9th instant I received orders from you relative to the attack on Satiru to take place the following morning, and at 2 a.m., the 10th instant, the Mounted Infantry, "D" and "F" Companies, with "C" and one section "G" forming a composite company, in all 229 native ranks, with nine officers, four British non-commissioned officers, one British non-commissioned officer, Royal Army Medical Corps, marched with the remainder of the column on Satiru, Lieutenant Fendall, with a section, forming the advance screen, and the remainder of the Mounted Infantry following in rear of the Infantry during the night.

At about 7 a.m. the column came in sight of the town of Satiru, and under orders from yourself the Mounted Infantry moved away to our right flank, with the object of working round the enemy should they come out of Satiru to the attack, and seeking a position from whence to bring flanking fire to bear upon them, and also to be ready to take up the pursuit.

The ground on this flank, west of Satiru, is not very favourable for the carrying out of such an object. I had been led to suppose, from reports brought in, that high ground commanded the town on this side. The high ground which I suppose was meant in these reports was, however, discovered to be too far distant to be of any value to us, and we were, therefore, forced to come across a low-lying valley with gently rising ground, up to the town, which lay just behind this rise, and was thus invisible to anyone approaching by this line until within some 200 yards of it. While in this valley the Infantry square and the main body of the enemy were also invisible to us.

About 8 a.m. the sound of firing from the Infantry square was heard, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant Fendall and his section, having cleared the front of the Infantry, joined the rest of the Mounted Infantry.

As we continued to move across the valley a number of the enemy appeared coming over the rise to our front, and commenced coming down the hill to attack us. I accordingly formed square, and when the enemy were within about 400 yards, opened fire. Their loss was heavy, but in spite of this they continued to advance with great determination, the leaders of the line being within 100 yards of the square before their advance was stopped. Those that were left then fell back behind the rise. Having sent scouts on to the top of the ridge, I ordered an advance to the crest line, when the town came into [? view] within some 200 yards of us with a large number of the enemy in a straggling line around its edge. I immediately ordered dismounted action, and our fire drove back the enemy, who had once more advanced on us, into the town. From the position now gained a view of the Infantry square some 100 yards distant on our left flank was obtained. Being anxious to keep my men in hand for the pursuit, I did not consider myself justified in pushing on into the town, and as my position appeared likely to mask the fire of the now advancing Infantry, I retired the Mounted Infantry some 200 to 300 yards down the slope. This manœuvre was misunderstood by the enemy who, apparently thinking they had driven us back, charged out of the town and up and over the crest line with loud shouts.

This temerity cost them dear, as halting and rapidly coming into action again, our fire caused them considerable loss as they advanced over the sky line, and once more they fell back, leaving many dead and wounded on the field.

Shortly after this, about 9 a.m., shells from the main body commenced to fall into the town, and I accordingly commenced to move round the rear (south-west) of the town, where a few scattered fugitives were to be seen going away in a southerly direction.

At 9.30 a.m. I received a message from Major Goodwin informing me that a large number of the enemy had left the town on the east side, covered from view by the ground, and ordering me to pursue.

As we were in the act of moving off to follow this party, a large number of the enemy were seen leaving the town on the west side, and running down the hill

lately occupied by us, now about a mile distant. I decided to deal with this lot first, and swinging round formed line of half companies, thus bringing the whole into two lines—charging formation—and commenced galloping after them.

Having delivered this charge we immediately retraced our steps, swinging round the south of the town and up over a long rocky ridge which runs roughly north-east and south-west, some 1,000 yards east of the town. Crossing this we descended the valley on the far side, and a mile further on came in sight of a stream of fugitives going away on our right front, *i.e.*, going south. We at once pursued. Our pace was here considerably checked by the nature of the ground, which became rocky and broken with a gradual ascent up to a rocky plateau on which was a clump of small villages.

It was now 10.45 a.m., and we had come some four miles since leaving Satiru, and the horses were showing signs of distress from the pace and distance. I therefore halted and watered the horses at some wells we discovered near one of the villages, sending back a report to Major Goodwin of what I was doing.

From the top of the plateau a good view of the open valley below could be obtained, stretching away for some four or five miles to a further ridge of hills covered with bush. The enemy appeared in all directions scattered in twos and threes across this valley.

After watering, which, owing to the nature of the wells, took some little time, I extended my three companies across this valley, moving in a north-easterly direction in a long driving line.

About 1.30 p.m., I received a message from Captain Macdonell, with the outside company, that he had met some of the Marafe's men, who had given him information of a considerable number of the enemy escaping into the thick bush on our right flank.

I accordingly collected the three companies again, and started in pursuit.

The bush gradually became thicker, and our progress consequently slower, as I thought it desirable to move on as broad a front as possible to avoid missing any of the enemy who might turn off the path and lie down in the bush.

After pushing some four to five miles into the bush, my advance scouts reported the enemy close in front of us. They had apparently halted in a patch of very thick thorn bush, and taking advantage of this were preparing to make a stand, and at the same time sending parties under cover of the bush to work round our flanks. I at once closed up, formed square, and opened fire.

So thick was the bush here, that although the enemy were then within 150 yards of us, they could not be seen by the men when dismounted to fire, and we could only fire volleys outwards.

This fire, however, proved extremely effective, inflicting considerable loss, and this, which I believed to have been, and which subsequent events proved to have been, the last collected body of the enemy, scattered in all directions.

It was now 2.30 p.m., and we were in a country where it was next to impossible to manœuvre mounted men, owing to the density of the bush. As far as I could ascertain, no formed body of the enemy remained in front of us.

The horses had been under the saddle since 2 a.m., and were very done. I was far from any suitable halting place for the night, and did not consider that any adequate advantage would be gained by further involving my men in this waterless and inhospitable country. I therefore, after a short halt, returned to Satiru for the night, getting into camp at 6.30 p.m. I returned to Satiru on the morning of the 11th instant.

I beg to bring to your notice the following, whose services are especially deserving of recognition:—

Captain D. H. Macdonell. An officer of exceptional ability and gallantry. His example and great personal influence with his men went far to re-establish the confidence of the men of "C" Company. Although wounded early in the day, he continued to handle his men with great dash and judgment.

Lieutenant P. W. Fendall. An excellent officer who rendered valuable assistance by reconnaissance work, and has shown marked capacity for commanding men in the field.

Sergeant T. Browning. Did excellent work, both on the march from Kano and during the action on 10th instant.

Sergeant H. Bullock, Royal Army Medical Corps, has been untiring in his care of both Europeans and natives in the Mounted Infantry since leaving Kano. The valuable work done by him has contributed not a little to the satisfactory state of health of all ranks in the column.

No. 195, Company Sergeant-Major Garaba Kukua, No. 472, Sergeant Momadu Gombi, "F" Company, Mounted Infantry.

No. 1141, Company Sergeant-Major Basheru Sokoto, No. 472, Sergeant Moma, "D" Company, Mounted Infantry.

The above native non-commissioned officers, by their example and personal influence with their men, rendered valuable service.

A. D. GREEN, Major,
Commanding Mounted Infantry.

Sokoto,
March 12, 1906.

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

Brigade Office, Northern Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Zungeru, May 20, 1906.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report *re* my operations in the Kano Province.

2. In accordance with your instructions attached, the following force left Kano on the 16th April, 1906:—

Colonel A. W. G. Lowry-Cole, D.S.O., in command.
Staff Officer, Captain and Brigade-Major H. ff. Searight.
Orderly Officer, Lieutenant C. R. U. Savile.
Provost-Marshal and Supply Officer, Captain E. C. Hides.
Transport Officer and Veterinary Officer, Lieutenant H. C. Welch.
Medical Officer, Dr. E. A. Chartres.
Captain H. C. L. Cock, commanding Artillery.
Major A. D. Green, D.S.O., commanding Mounted Infantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Dobell, D.S.O., commanding Infantry.

Artillery:

One officer, one British non-commissioned officer, 33 rank and file, and two 2·95″ quick-firing guns.

Mounted Infantry:

Six officers (two attached to Infantry), four British non-commissioned officers (one attached to Infantry), (one to transport), 100 rank and file.

Infantry, 1st Battalion, Northern Nigeria Regiment:

Two officers, two British non-commissioned officers, and 166 rank and file, one Maxim gun.

Infantry, 2nd Battalion, Northern Nigeria Regiment:

Six officers, two British non-commissioned officers, 165 rank and file.

Medical Department:

One British non-commissioned officer.
160 rounds 2·95 gun ammunition, 300 rounds per rifle small-arm ammunition, 380 carriers.
Captain H. C. B. Phillips, D.S.O., Resident, Kano Province, and Captain B. A. Rice, Assistant Resident, Political Department.

3. Supplies had been collected in the Kano Province along the route Gesawa-Debbi-Ringin-Mejia Road under arrangements made by the Resident, but owing to the scarcity of water on the latter part of the road, particularly after entering Hadeija territory, I thought it better to diverge at Ringin and pass by a road which ran by Ghunka and Mega and Adiyawa. This enabled me to draw supplies before entering Hadeija territory at Mega, a large prosperous town, and use the river water from Adiyawa to Hadeija in approaching the latter place. To minimise the difficulties in feeding and watering the force, the bulk of the Mounted Infantry, till reaching Mega, preceded the rest of the force one day in advance. Though moving through an ostensibly friendly country, military precautions had to be observed, as it was possible that, aided and abetted by the Hadeija chiefs, a treacherous attack might at any time be sustained. On the 22nd, Adiyawa, the first considerable Hadeija village, was reached. The inhabitants had been summoned by the Emir of Hadeija to send their fighting men in, but had disregarded his orders. Here information was gathered that other towns and villages had, however, sent in their fighting men, and orders issued by the Emir for all traders, non-combatants, and women to quit Hadeija. Everything, therefore, seemed to point to intended resistance. The distance from Adiyawa to Hadeija is about 14 miles. As it was thought probable that an attack would be made on the expeditionary force en route from Adiyawa to Hadeija, and as the heat was very great in the daytime, I decided to move, on the morning of the 22nd, only as far as a village on the river some five miles from Hadeija, and camp there for the heat of the day and night. The baggage could have, on the the following day, been left here under a guard, and the combatant portion moved to join hands with the Hadeija Garrison in the event of the Hadeija chiefs showing signs of engaging us outside their walls. However, on reaching this village I was joined by a half company Mounted Infantry of the garrison under Captain E. B. Macnaghten who, following instructions by me, had scouted the issues of the town and reported all quiet. I therefore continued my journey to the fort that evening, and arrived about 5 p.m. without molestation, joining hands there with the garrison, which brought up the strength of my force to:

22 officers.
1 medical officer.
9 British non-commissioned officers.

Artillery:

33 men and two 2·95″ quick-firing guns.

Mounted Infantry:

186 rank and file and one Maxim.

Infantry:

468 rank and file and two Maxims.

4. On arrival, after sifting the local information, I consulted with the Resident, Captain Phillips, as to the best way of carrying out Your Excellency's instructions. The conditions to be submitted to the Emir among others included the surrender of certain of his most powerful chiefs. It seemed certain to both Captain Phillips and myself that if a night was allowed to elapse between the submission of the conditions and any measures we might take to enforce them, these men would escape, but we also came to the conclusion that your instructions to the Resident demanded that a period approaching 24 hours should be given for their consideration, should this be required.

It was advisable that if the main wall was defended, it should be attacked just before daylight, it being a very formidable obstacle, and unbreachable by any guns I had. Escalade was the only way of surmounting it, and this, in the daytime, would have entailed heavy loss, and might possibly have failed. It was decided, therefore, to send in the ultimatum very early on the morning of the 24th, at the same time observing all the gates with the mounted troops, and stopping entry and issue at the same time. The Emir was informed of this, and further, that if he sent his answer at once it would be understood he did not require any period for consideration, and we should act accordingly. Should his answer be received at once, and hostilities be necessary, I had decided to demonstrate in the evening with a view to

drawing the enemy beyond his walls to fight in the open, or failing, to build thorn zarebas strengthened with wire round the outsides of the south gates, watching them with mounted troops during the night, and carrying out the assault just before daylight.

Before daylight, Major Green and the Mounted Infantry moved out to watch the gates. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell, with Lieutenants Savile and H. H. Shott, were sent by me with the Mounted Infantry to make a special reconnaissance of the wall on the northern side, including the Mashena gate, with a view to selecting a place to escalade. I intended to make two false attacks against the eastern gate and between that and the Mashena gate with the main body while Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell and 150 rank and file effected the escalade at a point just west of the Mashena gate. It was known that the outside guarding wall to the eastern gate could be breached for a breadth of about six feet, and then fire brought to bear on the door of the gate, and this I hoped to do when the defenders had been taken in reverse by Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell's party. The party effected their reconnaissance without difficulty, as the wall on this side was found unoccupied.

5. The troops stood to arms at daylight, and at 7.45 a.m. the Resident informed me that he had received an answer from the Emir. He, the Emir, had struck the messenger, and told him to tell the Resident if he wanted to arrest anyone he had better come and do it. As the eastern gate was reported unoccupied, I decided that the only thing to do was to move at once, and I sent Lieutenant A. A. C. Fitz-Clarence and one Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, to occupy the gate at once. This was effected without opposition, and I was enabled to deploy my force inside the wall.

I attach a rough sketch* of the city. It will be noted that there is an inner wall and ditch, and, though this is in a ruined condition, it still offers considerable cover to a defending force, and generally good cover from view. Inside this, and extending beyond, as shown, are the buildings of the town, which consist of substantial mud houses enclosed in compounds with mud walls varying from two to four feet thick, and five to eight feet high. Narrow streets radiate towards the Emir's house enclosure which stands in the centre close to an open space as shown. The enclosure to the Emir's dwelling houses is a substantially built wall some 20 feet high, about eight feet thick at bottom, and two feet at top. It has one entrance from the open square of the town. This is the usual mud gateway passage about eight feet wide. Inside is a succession of court yards and narrow passages.

Between the inner and outer walls of the town, except where houses of light construction prolong to the gates as shown, the ground is open, opposite the eastern gate about 400 to 500 yards across.

From where we were drawn up, inside the outer wall, we could just see the heads of the enemy's mounted men moving about behind the ruined wall apparently ready for action. I was not satisfied myself that they really meant to oppose us, so I sent the Resident's interpreter up to the entrance (a fairly broad open street) to warn the people if they laid down their arms and came out they had nothing to fear. I sent him a second time, and again a third time. This latter time he was so frightened by their attitude that to hurry them I ordered a shell to be fired at the Emir's house. I had just ordered Lieutenant Shott to accompany the interpreter to give them a fourth warning, when suddenly a body of the enemy's mounted spearmen galloped over the rise "H," which forms the entrance to the main street, full at our line.

I ordered Maxim and volley firing, and the leading men were, in a few seconds, quite swept away, those behind retiring behind cover. Undeterred, however, they re-formed, and came on again with the same result.

I thought they would now give in, and waited 20 minutes to give them time. I was still reluctant to enter the town, as I felt sure it would mean many casualties and destruction of property, so, as an inducement to give in, I ordered the two guns to open on the Emir's enclosure, which stood well above the rest of the town. The result was not very satisfactory, but eventually the tower of his house was set on fire. I sent mounted patrols round the outskirts to either

* Not sent.

flank to reconnoitre, and warn any disposed to give in to come out by the flanks so as not to mask my fire. After a little time, as the issues of the streets and compounds were still reported held, and shots and arrows were fired at any who approached the inner wall, I at length decided to enter the town.

I sent Lieutenant C. M. Leatham and one Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, to the right to advance up the main street and approaches from the north-east, and Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell with two Companies, 2nd Northern Nigeria Regiment, direct from the east and adjoining streets in the same direction.

The compounds and streets were stubbornly held, the mounted men charging down them on our men repeatedly, while slugs and arrows were fired from the doors and walls on the street sides. After about 1½ hours' fighting, Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell reached the vicinity of the Emir's enclosure with Captain R. L. Beasley and Lieutenant C. S. Burnett, and parts of the two Companies, 2nd Northern Nigeria Regiment, the remainder being scattered about on his right under Captain P. H. Short and Lieutenant Shott. Here the resistance was very stubborn, and after some delay he sent back to me for guns to breach the wall and reinforcements, as the men had got much scattered in the streets. I pushed these up at once, but before they could reach him, he, with the assistance of Captain Beasley and Lieutenant Burnett, had collected a sufficient force and rushed the entrance, killing and capturing most of the defenders. In the meantime large numbers of the poorer inhabitants, having laid down their arms, came pouring out by the flanks, and were collected behind the reserve near the eastern gate. I estimated these at between 3,000 and 4,000.

As soon as the Emir's enclosure was occupied, about 1 p.m., I withdrew troops, sending strong mounted patrols to clear out all stragglers. Guards were placed on the gates, and the unarmed inhabitants, with the exception of the ringleaders, were permitted to return to their homes. I am glad to say only a few outlying compounds of the town were burnt. Officers and British non-commissioned officers deserve much credit for the control they kept over their men under very trying circumstances. Street fighting is always demoralising, and the native soldier considers loot the natural sequence of victory. The heat was intense, the thermometer in the Fort registering 115° in the shade, and most of the Europeans were, at the close, completely exhausted. The fighting was chiefly carried on by the chiefs and their following, all mounted men, armed with sword, spears, bows and arrows. Many wore shirts of chained mail of extraordinarily strong manufacture, probably from Morocco.

The chiefs seem to have made up their minds to fight to a finish. The Emir and his son were shot charging boldly at a few yards' range. The poorer inhabitants took but little part in the fighting, except during the earlier stages, and as far as I could ascertain there were few casualties amongst them. It is difficult to account for the obstinate and senseless bravery of the chiefs. I think that at the first this was due to their never having faced magazine rifle fire, and from their having had for several generations an unbeaten record as regards their neighbours. Some were undoubtedly frenzied with intoxicating drinks and drugs.

7. Though in regard to weapons the combat was unequal, the conditions gave many opportunities for good leading and adventurous work, and all did well. The intense heat during the whole time since our departure from Kano and the bad quality of the water were much felt by the Europeans, and added much to the hardships of the operations. It is difficult to particularise where all did well, but the following deserve special mention:—

Staff:

Captain H. fforde Searight, Staff Officer.
Lieutenant and Veterinary Surgeon, H. C. Welch, Transport Officer.
Captain and Quarter-Master E. C. Hides, Provost Marshal and Supply Officer.

Artillery:

Sergeant-Major Dan Yaro.

Mounted Infantry:

Major A. D. Green, D.S.O.
Captain E. B. Macnaghten.
Farrier-Sergeant W. Vaudrey.
No. 658, Company Sergeant-Major Dandara.

Infantry:

Captain and Brevet-Major (local Lieutenant-Colonel) C. M. Dobell, D.S.O., 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, Commanding Infantry.
Lieutenant H. H. Shott
Lieutenant C. S. Burnett
Colour-Sergeant W. McLeod
No. 2650, Private Esu
No. 3244, Private Bagirimi
} 2nd Northern Nigeria Regiment.

Medical:

Staff-Sergeant W. Woodell.

8. Schedules are attached showing casualties and ammunition expended.

9. After the action I collected all horses which had been captured, and these were sold by auction, and the proceeds credited to Government. Schedule is attached showing details and disposal. Many of the horses were wounded, which accounts for their low prices.

10. No supplies were taken from the town, and those collected en route were met by the ration vote.

11. I attach maps* showing the itinerary and description of the action.

12. The Medical Department attached to the Force showed zeal and solicitude in caring for the health of the troops. They had a large number of wounded of the enemy to deal with.

13. I wish to place on record my appreciation of the excellent work done by Captain and Acting Resident H. C. B. Phillips, D.S.O., and Captain and Assistant Resident B. A. Rice in collecting supplies for the Force, and their hearty co-operation and unfailing courtesy. The former remained present during the greater part of the action, though suffering from fever.

14. I have not furnished the usual intelligence report, as the operations were conducted over roads already surveyed by Political Officers, and through a district reported on by them.

I have, &c.,
A. Lowry-Cole, Colonel,
Commandant, Northern Nigeria Regiment,
West African Frontier Force.

His Excellency
The High Commissioner,
Northern Nigeria.

No. 27.

The NIGER COMPANY, LIMITED, to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received October 23, 1906.)

The Niger Company, Limited, Surrey House, Victoria
Sir, Embankment, London, W.C., October 23, 1906.

I desire to bring to the notice of the Secretary of State the unsatisfactory state of affairs, politically and commercially, now existing in regard to the Munshi country in Northern Nigeria. This country falls under the Unsettled Districts Proclamation, whereby traders are prevented from entering under heavy penalty.

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* Not reproduced.

Parts of this territory, and the country immediately to the south of it, along the German frontier, are reported to contain rubber forests, but the roads thereto are blocked, and the whole of this area remains practically a sealed book.

In August of last year, the present Acting High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria proceeded up to the Katsena Allah River, a tributary of the Benue, bordering the Munshi country on the east as far as Katsena town, which is about the limit of navigation.

Mr. Wallace invited the Company's Agent-General to open up a station there the following season. The latter reported as follows: September 3rd, 1905. "They are going to place a post there, and hope gradually to bring the natives to reason. It is not around Katsena that they are hostile, but principally in the lower reaches of the river, where the Company's employees were killed in 1886. From what I can learn this river taps a splendid rubber country, and I am strongly of opinion that we should take advantage of this move on the part of the Government, and open at Katsena next high water. Mr. Wallace admitted that it would be rather premature to open this year (1905), as they hope to do a good deal in the ensuing year towards opening up the country."

This was, no doubt, Sir Frederick Lugard's intention at the time that the raid on Abinsi took place last winter. His Majesty's Government, however, decided that the expedition which was then despatched should limit its operations to the punishment of the actual offenders; and subsequently this object was further curtailed, owing to the Sokoto outbreak, which necessitated the hasty withdrawal of the force.

This year the Company again applied to be allowed to establish at Katsena, and have received the following reply from the Acting Political Assistant:—

> "In reply to your letter of 29th August, stating that you would be prepared to open at Katsena and other places in the Munshi country if protection can be promised, I am directed to say that the matter is again before the Secretary of State, and that it is hoped his consent may be obtained to traverse and subdue the Munshi country during the coming dry season. His Excellency does not think it would be sound policy to put soldiers at Katsena Allah before this has first been done."

I venture most strongly to urge that the Acting High Commissioner's request may receive favourable consideration on the following grounds:—

(1.) That in view of the heavy grant in aid, it is of the utmost importance that every possible opening for development of trade should be sought and taken advantage of.

(2.) That in this case it is not a question of a punitive expedition, but a demonstration of force to repair the bad effects of last year's withdrawal, and to open up and keep open the roads to the interior.

(3.) That the present policy of inaction on the part of the Administration can no longer be pursued with credit; that it is, moreover, playing into the hands of the Germans, whose agents are reported to make frequent incursions over the border into British territory, for the purpose of collecting rubber and ivory.

Should, however, His Majesty's Government consider it inadvisable to risk a conflict by sending an armed force to traverse and occupy the country, however strongly this course is urged by the trading community, I venture to suggest as an alternative policy that a first step towards establishing peaceful relations might be attempted by the traders themselves, with Government assistance.

With this object in view, I submit that a strong Government post be established as early as practicable, *i.e.*, next season, at Katsena town; simultaneously with this occupation the Niger Company would undertake to open a trading station at that place, and, using it as a base, would open up trading relations with the natives in the vicinity, and, by gradually extending their operations, would endeavour to bring about by peaceful means the subjugation of the entire district.

I trust that the Secretary of State will give this matter his early consideration, as the interests of the Protectorate generally will continue to suffer so long as a policy of inaction in regard to this particular portion of it is pursued.

I have, &c.,
SCARBROUGH.

No. 28.

COLONIAL OFFICE to SIR F. LUGARD.

[*Answered by No.* 29.]

SIR, Downing Street, November 22, 1906.

I AM directed by the Earl of Elgin to inform you that a letter* has been received from the Chairman of the Niger Company relating to the opening of the Munshi country in Northern Nigeria to trade in which it is suggested that, if His Majesty's Government consider it undesirable to send an armed force to traverse and occupy the country, as an alternative policy a first step towards establishing peaceful relations might be attempted by the traders themselves, with Government assistance. With this object, it is suggested that a strong Government post should be established as early as practicable at Katsena town; and that the Niger Company should undertake to establish simultaneously with this occupation a trading station at that place, and, using it as a base, should open up trading relations with the natives in the vicinity, and by gradually extending their operations, should endeavour to bring about by peaceful means the subjugation of the entire district.

2. Lord Elgin desires, if possible to open up this country by peaceable means, and to avoid the despatch of any large military expedition for the employment of forcible methods. It is, however, within his Lordship's recollection that, in conversation with him, you spoke strongly of the insecurity of the lower part of the Benue River; and in the letter from the Niger Company above referred to, a report from the Company's Agent-General, dated the 3rd of September, 1905, is quoted, to the effect that it is not around Katsena that the natives are hostile, but principally in the lower reaches of the river, where the Company's employees were killed in 1886.

3. If this is the case, it may be that to establish a post at Katsena would be to place it out of striking distance of the dangerous part of the river route, and the object of avoiding a special military expedition in the early future might not be attained. His Lordship would accordingly be glad to be favoured with your views upon the proposal before a reply is sent to the Niger Company.

I am, &c.,
R. L. ANTROBUS.

No. 29.

SIR F. LUGARD to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received November 29, 1906.)

SIR, Abinger Common, Surrey, November 26, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge Mr. Antrobus's letter of November 22nd† relative to the opening up of the Munshi country in Northern Nigeria.

2. It is true that the town of Katsena Allah on the Katsena River is not situated within striking distance of the most hostile part of the Munshi and Okpoto countries—the most troublesome part of which is the Eastern Okpoto country lying just east of longitude 8°. The Munshis are not only quite distinct from the Okpotos, but are themselves divided into several clans, which are at times at war with each other, I believe. If one of these clans established friendly relations with Government it would not probably form any inducement to the others to do the same.

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* No. 27. † No. 28.

3. Efforts which have extended over the whole period since the administration was formed have constantly been made to establish peaceful relations with the comparatively small section of the tribe on the north of the Benue, but with no very great success. This section has, moreover, on more than one occasion felt the power of the Government in consequence of outrages. It is a most regrettable fact that these sturdy and industrious tribes appear, like almost all Africans, to be incapable of settling down peaceably until they have appreciated the strength of the Government and the devastation which Maxims can inflict. Though they may for a time appear to be friendly disposed, any temporary friction is enough to dissipate their friendliness, and to cause an outbreak, for they consider that the only possible reason for our forbearance is fear. With truculent and vain savages, who consider themselves the superiors of Europeans, and invincible, I have found by long experience that less bloodshed is incurred by an exhibition of force at first. I fear, therefore, that the occupation of Katsena Allah is not likely to obviate the necessity, sooner or later, of an exhibition of force, and that the coercion of the hostile sections of the Munshi and Okpotos clans will have to be undertaken before the country can be opened up to trade and to peaceful relations.

4. If a company of the Northern Nigeria Regiment is stationed at Katsena, it will be in a somewhat isolated and detached position until the whole country is rendered safe and communications can be established with the company at Akwatcha in Bassa. If, moreover, the Niger Company open a trading station on the understanding that a force will be stationed at Katsena for their protection, a pledge that it will permanently remain there is practically given, and it cannot be withdrawn in any emergency, however great, elsewhere.

5. On the other hand, I have no doubt that the presence of a company of troops and of a trading establishment on the River Katsena would have a civilising and quieting effect and would greatly encourage trade. Lord Elgin cannot wish more strongly than I do myself that it were possible to employ only peaceable means for opening up the country, but I am, nevertheless, compelled to say that experience points in the opposite direction, and that there is more chance of a lasting settlement and of less ultimate bloodshed by first traversing such a country by troops and occupying the areas traversed by garrisons for some time afterwards.

I have, &c.,
F. D. LUGARD.

No. 30.

THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received November 30, 1906.)

[*Answered by Nos.* 31 *and* 32.]

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
Zungeru, November 1, 1906.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to request that I may be allowed to bring under subjection the Okpoto country in the Bassa Province, during the coming dry season, as these people, far from settling down, are daily becoming more truculent and daring, and are actually raiding the roads within a day's march of headquarters at Dekina.

2. This open defiance of our authority renders the task of keeping the friendly and loyal towns most difficult, and I am, therefore, compelled to ask your Lordship's sanction for this measure. Once the people are brought under control, steps will be taken to effectively occupy the country.

3. I have an ample staff of political officers to undertake this work; the lack of which was the cause of the non-success of the last expedition which marched through and conquered part of the country and then immediately left it, inflicting fines as it went, which could not possibly have been recovered without employment of further force.

4. I discussed this subject with Sir Walter Egerton, and requested his co-operation on his side of the boundary; he was rather adverse to take any steps in the matter, as he has a strongly-rooted objection to marching a force through unconquered parts of his Colony without being in a position to occupy and rule them, as otherwise the work has all got to be done over again. However, he promised to co-operate along his boundary for a distance of 30 miles; coming from Idah, the moral effect of this assistance will be very great as the Okpoto tribe still look to the Attah of Idah as their head.

5. Part of the force employed in this work could, after the Okpoto people are dealt with, march right through the heart of the Munshi country to Katsena Allah on the river of that name. This would be a most valuable reconnaissance, and, I believe, the force would march through in peace, as the news of the subjugation of the Okpotos would precede the expedition and would show the Munshi tribe how useless resistance would be.

6. From the information thus gained we would then try to peacefully occupy the country and get it opened up to trade. The European trading firms here are all most anxious to begin operations directly they can safely enter.

I have, &c.,
WM. WALLACE,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 31.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER.

(Sent 1.15 p.m., January 2, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

Referring to your despatch of November 1st,* you may take such measures as may be necessary to put a stop to Okpoto raids near Dekina and guarantee navigation of Benue, but cannot sanction march through Okpoto and Munshi countries. Despatch follows by mail.—ELGIN.

No. 32.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER.

[*Answered by No.* 33].

SIR, Downing Street, January 4, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 1st of November,* in which you propose to take measures to subdue the Okpoto country by the despatch of a military expedition in February next, which, after dealing with the Okpoto, should march through the Munshi country to Katsena Allah.

2. The question of imposing order on these tribes has engaged my careful consideration since the Munshi expedition of last spring, and I transmit, for your information, copies of correspondence† with Sir F. Lugard and the Niger Company upon the subject.

3. I consider it necessary that any tribe that commits overt acts of violence, as you report to be the practice of the Okpotos, should be promptly punished, and that the punishment should be followed up by such occupation of posts in or within convenient reach of the offenders' country as will ensure that the effects of the punishment shall not be lost. It is also necessary that the navigation of the Benue River should be kept safe from molestation. I desire that no outrage or aggression on the part of the natives should be tolerated, but that your Government should

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* No. 30. † Nos. 27, 28, and 29.

also abstain from any action which may constitute an aggression or a cause of grievance to the native tribes. If aggression is punished and suitable posts are established for the continued preservation of order, I should look to the recognition of the benefits of secure trading by the natives for the further extension of pacific influences.

4. I should, therefore, favour the proposal made by the Niger Company in their letter of the 23rd October* for the establishment of a post at Katsena in the Munshi country, and I approve of your proceeding accordingly, if you are satisfied that it would benefit trade and would not be dangerously isolated. With regard to your despatch† under acknowledgment, I desire that you will take such measures as you may consider necessary to put a stop to the raiding of roads by the Okpotos in the neighbourhood of Dekina and to guarantee the navigation of the Benue, but I am not prepared to sanction the proposed march through the Okpoto and Munshi countries, more especially in view of Sir W. Egerton's opinion, which I gather is shared by yourself, that it is useless to send a military force through a country unless we are prepared to remain in effective occupation.

I have, &c.,
ELGIN.

No. 33.

THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received April 20, 1907.)

Government House, Northern Nigeria,
Lokoja, March 25, 1907.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's despatch of the 4th January last,‡ and to inform you of the measures I have sanctioned for the patrol of the Okpoto and Agatu countries with the object of putting a stop to the raiding of the trade routes and to gradually bring the country into a state of submission to our Government:—

(1st.) That the Company which had so long been stationed at Akwatcha carrying out a policy of inaction, from which our prestige has undoubtedly suffered amongst the disaffected tribes, will, when brought up to its full strength—146—be sufficient for the patrol duty now sanctioned.

(2nd.) That fifty men under the direction of Assistant Resident Lang proceed slowly through the Agatu country lying to the north and east of Akwatcha, to get into touch with the people and to let them clearly understand that we will not brook their interference with traders who enter their country; also to settle all their principal differences with one another, differences often of long standing and which continually lead to strife and internecine warfare. The assessment of tribute tax will follow only after we have got a thorough grip of them.

(3rd.) Another fifty men will proceed to, and occupy one of, the friendly towns 25 miles to the south-east of Dekina, and, making that their base, will work gradually to the east with the same object in view as the Agatu patrol. As this will be the most important of the patrols, Mr. Cator, the Resident in charge of Bassa Province, will spend as much time as he can spare with it. The remaining 46 men will remain at Akwatcha to garrison that place and keep the neighbourhood in peace.

2. The patrols will make long stays at the principal places so as to give the people time to perceive that they are not raiding and to recognise our peaceful intentions, and also to show them that we are fully determined to keep and permanently occupy the country. Mr. Cator fully grasps Your Lordship's policy of peaceful penetration, and, I know, will do his utmost to give effect to it; and, I hope he will, at no distant date, be successful in bringing about, by peaceful means, the subjugation of the eastern portion of his province.

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* No. 27. † No. 30. ‡ No. 32.

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3. With regard to Katsena Allah, situate at the limit of navigation on the River Katsena, I am pleased to inform Your Lordship that the patrol from Muri under Captain Gordon has, as arranged last September while I was on the Benue, peacefully traversed for about three months the Munshi district to the east of the river described by Sir F. D. Lugard—"in the east they had constantly made aggression upon the tribes under our protection in the neighbourhood of Wukari, who have appealed in vain for protection hitherto"—and has now occupied that place, and there is now a permanent garrison of 58 men at Katsena Allah. This establishment will, I trust, have a quieting effect and will, with the assistance of the Niger Company who are to open a station at once, soon open a large trade in this district which should soon, with patrolling and tactful dealing with the people, lead to the pacification of the whole of the Munshi tribes lying to the south of the Benue.

4. Captain Gordon deserves much credit for this peaceful mode of penetration ending in the occupation of Katsena Allah without a shot being fired; and clearly shows what can be done by proceeding slowly and with circumspection, and I would ask that I be allowed to express to Captain Gordon and the officers concerned, Your Lordship's appreciation of their work.

I have, &c.,
WM. WALLACE,
Acting High Commissioner.